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ABSTRACT
For more than fifteen years, the FTC has regulated privacy and data security through its authority to police deceptive and unfair trade practices as
well as through powers conferred by specific statutes and international agreements. Recently, the FTC’s powers for data protection have been challenged
by Wyndham Worldwide Corp. and LabMD. These recent cases raise a fundamental issue, and one that has surprisingly not been well explored: How
broad are the FTC’s privacy and data security regulatory powers? How
broad should they be?
In this Article, we address the issue of the scope of FTC authority in the
areas of privacy and data security, which together we will refer to as “data
protection.” We argue that the FTC not only has the authority to regulate data
protection to the extent it has been doing, but that its granted jurisdiction can
expand its reach much more. Normatively, we argue that the FTC’s current
scope of data protection authority is essential to the United States data protection regime and should be fully embraced to respond to the privacy harms
unaddressed by existing remedies available in tort or contract, or by various
statutes. In contrast to the legal theories underlying these other claims of action, the FTC can regulate with a much different and more flexible understanding of harm than one focused on monetary or physical injury.
Thus far, the FTC has been quite modest in its enforcement, focusing on
the most egregious offenders and enforcing the most widespread industry
norms. Yet the FTC can and should push the development of norms a little
more (though not in an extreme or aggressive way). We discuss steps the FTC
should take to change the way it exercises its power, such as with greater transparency and more nuanced sanctioning and auditing.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than fifteen years, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) has regulated privacy and data security through its authority
to police deceptive and unfair trade practices as well as through powers conferred by specific statutes and international agreements.
Throughout most of this time, the FTC’s power to regulate privacy
and data security went unchallenged—until quite recently. In FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,1 a hotel chain challenged the FTC’s au1 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d
236 (3d Cir. 2015).
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thority to regulate data security practices.2 In LabMD, Inc.,3 a medical diagnostics company raised a similar challenge.4
These recent cases raise a fundamental issue, and one that has
surprisingly not been well explored: How broad are the FTC’s privacy
and data security regulatory powers? How broad should they be?
In this Article, we address the scope of the FTC’s authority over
privacy and data security, two related areas that together we will refer
to as “data protection.” We argue that the FTC not only has the authority to regulate data protection to the extent it has been doing, but
that it also has the authority to expand its reach much more. Normatively, we argue that the FTC’s current scope of data protection authority is essential to the U.S. data protection regime and should be
fully embraced to respond to the privacy harms unaddressed by existing torts, contracts, and statutes.
In Part I, we discuss the legal boundaries of the FTC’s data protection authority. We explore arguments made by critics of the FTC’s
data protection regulation that the FTC has been overstepping its authority in this domain. We respond by contending that the FTC’s data
protection authority is broad because it emerges from Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”),5 which has an
intentionally broad scope.
Critics contend that the FTC is engaging in a form of rulemaking
in this area where it lacks meaningful rulemaking authority. Worse
still, the critics argue, the FTC is attempting to enforce these “rules”
without articulating them clearly, and thus failing to provide adequate
notice about them. We argue that any time a broad standard is interpreted over time in a case-by-case adjudicatory manner, with an attempt to interpret consistently and treat prior decisions as having
precedential value, the result will be the gradual calcification of the
standard into a more rule-like structure. The FTC is not exceeding its
authority because this developmental pattern is practically inevitable.
We also argue that, contrary to the critics’ contentions, the FTC
has generally been quite clear and consistent in its approach. For ex2 Id. at 607; see also First Amended Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at
2, Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR) [hereinafter Wyndham Complaint]; Julie Sartain, Analyzing FTC v. Wyndham, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (Oct.
5, 2012), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/2012-10-11-analyzing-ftc-vs.-wyndham/.
3 Complaint, LabMD, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3099, 2013 WL 5232775 (F.T.C. Aug. 28,
2013) [hereinafter LabMD Complaint].
4 See Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Answer & Defenses to Admin. Complaint at 6, LabMD,
Inc., 2013 WL 5348553, at *3.
5 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
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ample, the FTC has based its data security jurisprudence on industry
standards and a reasonableness requirement instead of specific and
rigid rules. Such an approach is more conservative than the FTC
promulgating a set of standards all at once in a nonincremental manner. The standards evolve in a common-law-like fashion, a developmental pattern typified by incremental change and adherence to
precedent, consistency in decisions, and case-by-case adjudication
over time. In fact, if this pattern were not present, then the FTC
would be acting inconsistently, ignoring previous actions, or reaching
too far beyond particular cases.
Critics have also argued that the FTC’s authority cannot overlap
with that of other agencies, which it does in a number of instances.
We contend that Section 5 will inevitably overlap with other statutes
and regulatory domains, that the FTC routinely shares authority with
other administrative agencies, and that such overlap is manageable.
In Part II, we turn to the normative issues regarding the scope of
the FTC’s data protection authority. We contend that the FTC currently serves as an essential linchpin in the U.S. data protection regulatory regime. The U.S. privacy regulatory landscape developed as an
amalgamation of various federal and state laws along with a significant amount of self-regulation. The FTC has made the self-regulation
significantly more meaningful through its enforcement of the promises
companies make about the way they collect, use, and protect data.
The FTC has filled gaps when a number of large industries have not
been regulated by federal data protection statutes. In many instances,
the FTC is the only regulator with the resources to enforce necessary
protections like data security. Moreover, the FTC has played a pivotal role in promoting international confidence regarding privacy in
the United States. Loss of FTC privacy jurisprudence would threaten
the development of law designed to facilitate the international exchange of personal information, such as the former U.S.-E.U. Safe
Harbor agreement.
We also contend that the FTC is able to balance data protection
against countervailing interests in ways that other areas of law are currently unable to do. Contract law and tort law have thus far not been
frequently applied to many of the issues involving the collection, storage, use, and disclosure of personal data. More broadly, the law has
struggled to recognize privacy violations and data security breaches as
harms. The FTC can regulate with a much different and more flexible
understanding of harm than those focused on monetary or physical
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injury. According to the FTC, even incremental harms that affect a
large group of consumers can be substantial.
Next, we argue that the FTC has the authority to expand its data
protection regulation and that it should do so. The FTC’s broad authority to regulate unfair and deceptive acts is well-suited to incrementally develop a robust regime to tackle the privacy challenges
wrought by new technologies. So far, the FTC has developed its jurisprudence in a very measured and modest way. The FTC can and
should push in bolder and more aggressive directions, which might be
necessary as Big Data, the Internet of Things, data brokers, and other
challenges continue to vex courts and lawmakers. As a nimble agency
capable of directly and indirectly regulating both relationships and design, the FTC is the ideal authority to police a landscape fraught with
uncertainty.
In Part III, we explore the limits of the FTC’s Section 5 authority
over data protection. Materiality, balancing, and harm requirements
facially limit the scope of valid complaints. There are some types of
harm, such as purely emotional ones, that are better suited to the purview of torts and contracts. Compensatory remedies are also better
suited for torts or other statutes because the FTC’s role is largely to
discourage bad behavior. The FTC also operates under significant resource constraints, and has generally brought only about ten to
twenty-five privacy and data security cases per year. The FTC is also
subject to political pressure. So there is good reason not to completely abandon the panoply of other remedies for privacy harms.
For the FTC to continue in its current role regarding data protection and for it to expand this role, it must make some changes in the
way it exercises its power. Although the FTC has provided a fair
amount of notice to organizations, it can and should do more to inform companies of their obligations under Section 5. If the FTC is to
fully embrace its role as a data protector using the case-by-case approach, it should not only provide more detail in its complaints but
also in the quantity and substance of closing letters issued when an
investigation does not lead to a complaint. The FTC should also try to
encourage better data protection practices by avoiding a uniform approach to enforcement. Instead, the agency should seek milder punishments and shorter auditing periods from companies that
significantly protected data and made a good faith attempt at compliance, yet still ran afoul of Section 5.
Ultimately, we contend that far from being too broad and bold in
its authority, the FTC is currently too measured and conservative. Po-
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litical considerations and the newness of privacy and data security issues may justifiably explain the FTC’s modest approach. But now
data protection has matured into a more robust field, with more developed industry norms as well as a much more significant understanding of the issues among practitioners and the academy. The
magma has settled and started to cool, and the foundations are present for the FTC to step further into its developing role as the de facto
U.S. data protection agency.
I. THE BOUNDARIES

OF

FTC POWER

In the 1990s, the Internet was blossoming and concerns about privacy and data security were mounting. Despite a few laws regulating
certain industries, much of online commerce, and much of the collection and use of personal data more generally, were regulated primarily
by self-regulation.6
Enter the FTC. The agency had long been focused on consumer
protection, which it enforced through its powers under Section 5 of
the FTC Act.7 Under this statute, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”8 The
FTC began its foray into privacy and data security by focusing on
promises companies voluntarily made in their privacy policies.9 When
companies later failed to live up to these promises, the FTC claimed
that this was a deceptive trade practice.10
In this way, the FTC used the predominantly self-regulatory approach to privacy and data security as its foundation to build a foothold in the area of data protection. By “data protection,” we are
referring broadly to issues involving the privacy (collection, use, and
disclosure) and security (administrative, technical, and physical safeguards) of personal data. Over time, the FTC expanded beyond enforcing privacy policies to a broader conception of deception, one that
6 See, e.g., Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach
Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 130 (2008) (citing FED.
TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS i–ii (1998), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf; FED. TRADE
COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (1999), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/self-regulation-privacy-onlinea-federal-trade-commission-report-congress/1999self-regulationreport.pdf) (“The FTC initially sought to deal with
online privacy issues by encouraging industry self-regulation.”).
7 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598 (2014).
8 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
9 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 598–99.
10 Id. at 599.
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did not rely only on explicit promises made.11 The FTC soon uncoiled
its power to police unfair trade practices and began bringing claims.12
Today, the FTC has evolved into the broadest and most powerful
data protection agency in the United States. No other agency has such
a broad scope of power over so many different industries. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is limited to regulating entities subject to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),13 and countless industries do not
fall under HIPAA.14 Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission has jurisdiction over telecommunications, satellite, broadcast, and
cable companies, but its range does not extend much further.15
In contrast, the FTC’s scope covers nearly any for-profit entity
that handles personal data. Except for a few small industry carveouts, nearly every industry is subject to FTC enforcement power, including industries such as automotive, financial, health, retail, online
services, hospitality, entertainment, manufacturing, data processing,
food and beverage, transportation, and many more.16 Any industry
where consumers are involved is typically within the scope of FTC
enforcement power.
This broad grant of authority was designed precisely to avoid restrictive categories of practices that are unfair or deceptive.17 As the
FTC has taken a greater foothold in the data protection arena, critics
have pushed back, raising concerns over the proper scope of the
FTC’s power. For example, Wyndham Hotels argued:
The FTC’s brief asserts a staggeringly broad theory of
agency power. . . . The FTC believes that it can engage in
Id. at 628.
Id. at 638.
13 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 § 264(a), 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012).
14 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 587 & n.7.
15 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–152 (2012); What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www
.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 6, 2015) (“The Federal Communications Commission regulates interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and
cable . . . .”).
16 According to Section 5 of the FTC Act, the specific carve-outs of FTC jurisdiction are
“banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit
unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate
commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and
persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards
Act, 1921 . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
17 See H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (finding that, regarding unfairness, “[i]f Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless
task.”).
11
12
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such regulation without publishing any rules or regulations
explaining in advance what companies must do to comply
with the law. Instead, the FTC can provide no notice at all
and bring “case-by-case” enforcement actions against companies that have suffered cyber attacks. . . .
Such an Orwellian understanding of governmental
power is so foreign to our system of justice that Congress
could not possibly have intended the FTC to wield it.18
Wyndham and others have faulted the FTC for enforcement in
many areas also enforced by other agencies. For example, LabMD
notes in its dispute with the FTC that LabMD is also subject to enforcement by HHS.19 The FTC also enforces in areas regulated by
other federal and state statutes, such as data-breach notification laws20
and others.
How broad is the FTC’s authority? Has it exceeded appropriate
bounds? Is it encroaching upon areas that should be the exclusive
domain of other agencies? What are the proper boundaries? In this
Part, we examine the arguments by critics of the FTC that it has
pushed beyond the proper scope of its enforcement authority. We
then examine just how large the FTC’s boundaries actually are.
A. The Critiques of the FTC’s Data Protection Authority
The Wyndham case was the first and one of the most significant
challenges to the FTC’s data protection power to date. In that case,
the FTC alleged that Wyndham, a company that manages hotels and
sells timeshares, suffered a series of three breaches, where the breaching parties used similar techniques in all three instances to access personal information stored on the Wyndham-branded hotels’ property
18 Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts LLC
at 1, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. CV 12-1365PHX-PGR) [hereinafter Wyndham Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss]; see also Proposed
Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. in Support
of Defendants at 5, Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. 2:13-cv-01887-ES-SCM) [hereinafter
Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae] (“The FTC has overreached. It lacks the legal authority to act
as a roving regulator of data security standards, because the statute under which the FTC has
purported to act—Section 5 of the FTC Act—does not authorize the Commission to proceed as
it has in this case.”).
19 See Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss at 3 n.4, LabMD, Inc.,
FTC Docket No. 9357, 2014 WL 253518 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(e)
(2012) (confirming power of HHS Office for Civil Rights to “use corrective action” against persons who fail to comply with HIPAA requirements).
20 Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 673–76 (2013).
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management system servers, including “customers’ payment card account numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.”21
The FTC claimed that “[a]fter discovering each of the first two
breaches, Defendants failed to take appropriate steps in a reasonable
time frame to prevent the further compromise of” its network.22 According to the FTC, more than 619,000 consumers’ payment card account numbers were compromised, and “[c]onsumers and businesses
suffered financial injury, including, but not limited to, unreimbursed
fraudulent charges, increased costs, and lost access to funds or credit.
Consumers and businesses also expended time and money resolving
fraudulent charges and mitigating subsequent harm.”23
The FTC claimed that Wyndham deceptively stated in its privacy
policy that it protected its customers’ personal information by using
“industry standard practices” and “a variety of different security measures designed to protect personally identifiable information from unauthorized access by users both inside and outside of our company.”24
Other allegedly deceptive statements included a promise that Wyndham takes “commercially reasonable efforts to create and maintain
‘fire walls’ and other appropriate safeguards to ensure that to the extent [Wyndham] control[s] the Information, the Information is used
only as authorized by [Wyndham] and consistent with [its] Policy, and
that the Information is not improperly altered or destroyed.”25 The
FTC alleged that Wyndham actually provided deficient data security
practices contrary to their representations of following “industry standard practices.”26
In addition to claiming deceptiveness, the FTC also attacked
Wyndham’s data security practices on fairness grounds.27 Specifically,
the FTC identified practices that “unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”28
Among other things, the FTC alleged that Wyndham failed to use
readily available access guards (firewalls), allowed misconfiguration,
resulting in storage of credit card information in clear text, failed to
ensure implementation of adequate security policies before connecting to main network, and failed to remedy known security vulnerabili21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 18.
See id. at 8–10.
Id. at 9–10.
See id. at 2, 9.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 10.
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ties (for example by connecting insecure servers with outdated
operating systems (“OS”) unable to get security patches).29 Wyndham
also allowed computers with well-known default IDs to connect to
network, failed to make passwords hard to guess, failed to inventory
networked computers, failed to employ reasonable measures to detect
and prevent unauthorized access, failed to follow proper incident response procedures, including monitoring for malware postbreach, and
failed to adequately restrict third-party vendor access.30
Unlike nearly all other defendants in FTC actions,31 Wyndham
did not settle with the FTC. Instead, the FTC brought an action in
federal court.32 On April 7, 2014, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey issued its long-awaited opinion in the case.33
The court rejected Wyndham’s calls to create a data security exception
to the FTC’s broad authority to regulate unfair practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act.34 The court also rejected Wyndham’s assertion
that the FTC must formally promulgate regulations before bringing an
unfairness claim, as well as Wyndham’s argument that the FTC failed
to provide fair notice of what constitutes an unfair data security practice.35 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
rejection of Wyndham’s arguments.36
Wyndham made three principal arguments related to the scope of
the FTC’s unfairness authority in its April 26, 2013 motion to dismiss:
(1) the FTC unfairness authority does not extend to data security;
(2) the FTC has failed to give fair notice of what data security practices are required by law; and (3) Section 5 does not apply to the security of payment card data because there is no possibility for
consumer injury.37 U.S. District Judge Salas resolved each of these
issues in favor of the FTC and denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss.38
Regarding the scope of the FTC’s Section 5 authority, Wyndham
asserted that the “overall statutory landscape” made it clear that unId. at 10–12.
Id.
31 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 606–07.
32 See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 (D.N.J. 2014).
33 Id. at 602.
34 Id. at 612.
35 Id. at 617.
36 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
37 Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts LLC at 7, 14, 19, Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. 2:13-cv-01887-ES-SCM) [hereinafter Wyndham Motion to
Dismiss].
38 Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 631.
29
30
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fairness authority does not extend to data security.39 For example,
Wyndham noted that Congress has enacted targeted data-security legislation elsewhere yet failed to create a statute explicitly authorizing
the FTC to regulate data security.40 Relying on an analogous case,
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,41 Wyndham argued that
these targeted data security statutes indicated that the FTC lacked
broader authority to regulate in this area.42
Wyndham also argued that, like the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in Brown & Williamson, the FTC explicitly disclaimed
authority to regulate data security under Section 5’s unfairness
prong.43 Judge Salas, however, rejected the comparison: “[T]he Court
is not convinced that [prior FTC] statements, made within a threeyear period, equate to a resolute, unequivocal position under Brown
& Williamson that the FTC has no authority to bring any unfairness
claim involving data security.”44 The court noted that the FTC actually “brought unfairness claims in the data-security context shortly after these representations. And the FTC’s subsequent representations
confirm its authority in this arena, not deny it.”45
On appeal, the Third Circuit also rejected Wyndham’s argument
that because Congress enacted data security laws to regulate specific
industries, Congress did not intend for the FTC to be able to regulate
data security under the FTC Act.46 The court held that the FTC has
the power to regulate data security through Section 5.47 The court
examined several statutes granting the FTC authority to regulate data
security and distinguished the powers granted in these statutes from
the powers the FTC has under Section 5.48
Regarding fair notice, Wyndham argued that the FTC must “set
data-security standards in advance, so that businesses can fairly know
what is required of them before the FTC seeks to hold them liable.”49
The company also argued that the FTC failed to articulate exactly
39

Id. at 611.

40

Id. at 611 & n.4.

41

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).

42

Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 611.

43

Id. at 614.

44

Id.

45

Id. (citation omitted).

46

FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2015).

47

Id.

48

Id. at 248.

49

Wyndham Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 18, at 7.
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what the vague standards created by use of the terms “reasonable,”
“adequate,” or “proper” require.50
The FTC disagreed with Wyndham’s argument that rulemaking is
the only proper way for the FTC to regulate data security.51 According to the FTC, rulemaking would be inappropriate because data security is highly contextual and always changing.52 Regarding the
definition of “reasonable” security, the FTC argued that companies
can look to a few things for guidance: “(1) industry guidance sources
that [Wyndham] itself seems to measure its own data-security practices against; and (2) the FTC’s business guidance brochure and consent orders from previous FTC enforcement actions.”53
The FTC also asserted “data-security standards can be enforced
in an industry-specific, case-by-case manner,” analogizing its strategy
in regulating data security with the approach of other agencies that
bring actions without “particularized prohibitions” such as the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (“OSHA”).54
The Third Circuit took up the fair notice challenge by Wyndham
on due process grounds. Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, due process is violated if regulation “fails to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is
so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”55 The Third Circuit noted that the standard is “especially lax for civil statutes that regulate economic activities. For
those statutes, a party lacks fair notice when the relevant standard is
‘so vague as to be no rule or standard at all.’ ”56 The Third Circuit
concluded:
We thus conclude that Wyndham was not entitled to
know with ascertainable certainty the FTC’s interpretation
of what cybersecurity practices are required by § 45(a). Instead, the relevant question in this appeal is whether Wyndham had fair notice that its conduct could fall within the
Id. at 9.
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels & Resorts’ Motion to Dismiss at
11–13, Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. 2:12-cv-01365-PHX-PGR).
52 Id. at 12.
53 Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 616–17.
54 Id. at 617.
55 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012)).
56 Id. at 250 (quoting CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 631–32 (3d Cir.
2013)).
50
51
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meaning of the statute. If later proceedings in this case develop such that the proper resolution is to defer to an agency
interpretation that gives rise to Wyndham’s liability, we leave
to that time a fuller exploration of the level of notice required. For now, however, it is enough to say that we accept
Wyndham’s forceful contention that we are interpreting the
FTC Act (as the District Court did). As a necessary consequence, Wyndham is only entitled to notice of the meaning
of the statute and not to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute.57
The court went on to note that although “there will be borderline
cases where it is unclear if a particular company’s conduct falls below
the requisite legal threshold,” due process does not require lasersharp precision: “But under a due process analysis a company is not
entitled to such precision as would eliminate all close calls. Fair notice
is satisfied here as long as the company can reasonably foresee that a
court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the
statute.”58
Regarding injury, Wyndham argued that federal statutes and
“card-brand” rules eliminate the possibility that consumers can suffer
financial injury from the theft of payment-card data.59 Wyndham also
contended that “incidental injuries that consumers suffered” such as
the cost of remedial finance monitoring were insufficient to constitute
a “substantial injury.”60 Wyndham rejected the FTC’s interpretation
that consumer injury can include the aggravation, time, and effort associated with obtaining reimbursement from card issuers and otherwise responding to a data breach.61 This issue was not resolved by the
district court.62
The Third Circuit rejected Wyndham’s argument that the FTC
failed to establish “substantial injury to consumers” as required to enforce unfairness. It wrote:
Although unfairness claims “usually involve actual and completed harms, they may also be brought on the basis of likely
rather than actual injury.” And the FTC Act expressly contemplates the possibility that conduct can be unfair before
actual injury occurs. More importantly, that a company’s
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 621–22, 625.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623 n.15.
Id.
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conduct was not the most proximate cause of an injury generally does not immunize liability from foreseeable harms.63
On the heels of Wyndham, another defendant challenged the
FTC’s Section 5 enforcement authority in an FTC Adjudicative Proceeding. In LabMD, the FTC brought a complaint against a medical
testing laboratory alleging that the company “failed to reasonably protect the security of consumers’ personal data, including medical information.”64 In a press release, the FTC described its complaint as
alleging “that in two separate incidents, LabMD collectively exposed
the personal information of approximately 10,000 consumers.”65 The
FTC asserted that “LabMD billing information for over 9,000 consumers was found on a peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network and
then, in 2012, LabMD documents containing sensitive personal information of at least 500 consumers were found in the hands of identity
thieves.”66 The FTC claimed that this failure to “employ reasonable
and appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access to personal
information, including dates of birth, SSNs, medical test codes, and
health information,” was an unfair practice.67
In its motion to dismiss, LabMD made similar arguments to those
made by Wyndham. It asserted that the FTC lacks the authority
under a Section 5 unfairness theory to regulate patient-information
security practices and that the FTC has failed to provide fair notice of
what data security practices it believes Section 5 requires.68 One additional argument unique to LabMD was that only HHS, and not the
FTC, has the authority to regulate data security practices affecting patient data regulated by HIPAA.69
Although Wyndham and LabMD involved data security issues,
the import of their arguments extends to the whole domain of data
protection, including privacy. Essentially, the arguments boil down to
whether Section 5 authority can extend into areas regulated by other
laws, whether the FTC can continue in its case-by-case fashion in de63

Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 246 (citations omitted).

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Files Complaint Against LabMD for Failing to
Protect Consumers’ Privacy (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/
08/ftc-files-complaint-against-labmd-failing-protect-consumers; see also LabMD Complaint,
supra note 3.
64

R

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 5.

R

68

See Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 1, 14.

R

69

Id. at 12.
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veloping data protection jurisprudence, and whether the FTC is exercising unfairness authority in areas without clear consumer harm.
Beyond Wyndham and LabMD, various commentators have attacked the FTC for overreaching. Regarding data security, Michael
Scott has argued that the FTC’s data security complaints were
seemingly filed at random, without any guidelines, and without any advance notice to the respondents that their actions
might violate § 5 of the FTC Act. The complaints and consent orders entered into in these cases provide limited guidance as to what a company should do (or not do) to avoid
being the target of an unfairness action by the FTC if it experiences a security breach.70
Similarly, Berin Szoka and Geoffrey Manne have contended that:
At the heart of the discretionary model is the FTC’s ability
to operate without any real constraints. The Commission
hasn’t develop[ed] a predictable set of legal doctrines because that’s what courts do—and the FTC has managed to
strong-arm dozens of companies into settling out of court.
What the FTC calls its “common law of consent decrees” is
really just a series of unadjudicated assertions.71
In an amicus brief filed in Wyndham, TechFreedom, the International Center for Law & Economics, Berin Szoka, Geoffrey Manne,
and several other scholars including Gus Hurwitz, Todd Zywicki, and
Paul Rubin argued that the “FTC’s current approach to data security
denies companies like Wyndham ‘a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited’ and thus follow the law.”72
Gerard Stegmaier and Wendell Bartnick similarly argue that “although the FTC has undertaken significant efforts to develop and improve notice of its interpretation of Section 5, the nature, format, and
content of the agency’s data-security-related pronouncements raise
equitable considerations that create serious due process concerns.”73
The authors ask, “[i]f an entity cannot ascertain what the law is, how
Scott, supra note 6, at 183 (footnote omitted).
Berin Szoka & Geoffrey Manne, The Second Century of the Federal Trade Commission,
TECHDIRT (Sept. 26, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130926/
16542624670/second-century-federal-trade-commission.shtml.
72 Amici Curiae Brief of TechFreedom, Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ. & Consumer Prot.
Scholars at 7, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 2:13-cv01887(ES)(SCM)) [hereinafter Wyndham Amicus Brief], http://docs.techfreedom.org/Wyndham_Amici_Brief.pdf; see also Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon
Law, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (draft version available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574257##).
73 Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 20, at 676.
70

R

71

R
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can it know what it must do—especially where liability most commonly arises out of the malfeasance of others?”74
Other critics assail the FTC for taking action when there is not
sufficient consumer harm. According to James Cooper, “the harms
associated with the FTC’s privacy agenda are largely subjective and
intangible, often boiling down to little more than the creepy feeling of
being tracked online.”75
Critics like Szoka and Manne have not completely rejected the
FTC as a viable privacy regulator, however, particularly when compared to potentially static legislation. Regarding Facebook’s settlement with the FTC of complaints over allegedly deceptive privacyrelated statements, Szoka stated:
Case-by-case adjudication is a venerable American tradition—one that’s more, not less, vital in the rapidly changing
field of consumer privacy. Rather than rushing to write new
laws, Congress should focus on ensuring the FTC has the resources it needs to use its existing authority effectively. That
means, most of all, having a larger core of technologists on
staff to guide what is supposed to be our expert agency on
privacy.76
Similarly, Szoka and Manne elsewhere stated:
When Congress created the Federal Trade Commission
ninety-nine years ago today, it never imagined the Commission would become the primary agency responsible for grappling with technological change, but that’s precisely what the
FTC has become: the de facto Federal Technology Commission. In principle, this is mostly for the best. The FTC’s
case-by-case approach is far better suited to fast-changing industries, from broadband to Uber to data-driven tech companies, than the [Federal Communications Commission],
local taxicab commissions or European-style data protection
agencies.77
To Szoka and Manne, while the case-by-case approach is good in
theory, they still contend that “how the agency works is deeply probId.
James C. Cooper, Identity Theft, Not Big Data, Should Be at the Top of the FTC’s Priority List, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/09/24/identitytheft-not-big-data-should-be-at-the-top-of-the-ftcs-priority-list/2.
76 Szoka Statement on Facebook FTC Privacy Settlement, TECHFREEDOM (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://techfreedom.org/post/58365342326/szoka-statement-on-facebook-ftc-privacy.
77 Now in its 100th Year, the FTC has Become the Federal Technology Commission, TECHFREEDOM (Sept. 26, 2013), http://techfreedom.org/post/62344465210/now-in-its-100th-year-theftc-has-become-the-federal.
74
75
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lematic.”78 They argue that “neither this ‘common law of consent decrees’ nor the FTC’s privacy reports constitute actual law. It’s a
flexible approach, but only in the worst sense: made by disposing of
any legal constraints or due process.”79 As we explore below, the FTC
is actually bound by many constraints, including due process. While
the FTC’s jurisdictional reach and discretion are quite broad, this is by
design.80 Moreover, it is precisely this broad scope that makes the
FTC the most critical organization in the U.S. privacy regulatory
ecosystem.
B. The Scope of FTC Authority
Contrary to the arguments of some critics, the FTC enjoys a very
extensive data protection enforcement authority. Indeed, the scope of
its authority is intentionally broad. The legislative history of Section 5
demonstrates a clear intent that the FTC’s authority be evolutionary
and wide-reaching.
1. The Broad Concepts of Deception and Unfairness
As noted by District Court Judge Salas in Wyndham, the concepts
of deceptiveness and unfairness in the FTC Act are intentionally defined at an extremely broad level.81 Rather than attempt to define the
specific consumer protection issues that the FTC should focus on,
Congress created two broad categories—practices that are deceptive
and practices that are unfair—with virtually no hard boundary lines.82
Critics of the FTC in the Wyndham case point to legislative modifications of the FTC’s authority as evidence of Congressional intent that
the FTC be highly constrained,83 but this argument is misplaced. Even
in light of the limitations imposed by Congress84 in response to the
Id.
Id.
80 For example, the FTC has wide discretion as to which actor the FTC may file a complaint against and is not required to pursue worst actors or any actor in particular. See Moog
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1958) (per curiam).
81 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 615 (D.N.J. 2014).
82 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–44 (1972).
83 E.g., Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 18, at 3 (“Thirty years ago, the FTC
sought to significantly expand the scope of its Section 5 authority, invoking the then-extant version of the statute to advance its consumer protection goals in ways far beyond those envisioned
by Congress. Congress reacted to that overreach, codifying into law significant limits on the
scope of the FTC’s authority.”).
84 See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108
Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)).
78
79
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FTC’s earlier broad statements on deception and unfairness,85 the
FTC’s authority remains explicitly general and expansive.86
The scope of the FTC’s deceptiveness jurisdiction is far-reaching.
Any material representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer is actionable.87 This includes broken
promises of privacy and data security, deceptive actions to induce the
disclosure of information, and failure to give sufficient notice of privacy invasive practices.88 Although the requirement that a deception
be “material” to consumers89 constrains the scope of FTC enforcement power, misrepresentations can be made in virtually any context,
including boilerplate policies, marketing materials, and even the design of websites.90
Thus, the FTC’s deception authority extends far beyond policing
privacy policies. Although enforcing privacy policy promises was how
the FTC began its foray into the area, the concept of deception under
Section 5 is now much broader.
The FTC’s unfairness authority is also comprehensive. According to the FTC, “[t]he present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process. The statute was
deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the
impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that
would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion.”91 Notably, the FTC can find a practice unfair even when it is
otherwise legally permissible.92
Regarding the meaning of unfairness, the House Conference Report famously stated:
FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT OF POLICY ON THE SCOPE OF THE CONUNFAIRNESS JURISDICTION (1980), reprinted in Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
1072–88 (1984) [hereinafter cited as UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT with page references to Int’l Harvester Co.]; Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.,
103 F.T.C. 110, 175–98 (1984) [hereinafter cited as DECEPTION STATEMENT with page references
to Cliffdale Associates].
86 See UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT, supra note 85, at 1067–68; 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
87 See DECEPTION STATEMENT, supra note 85 at 183.
88 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 628–38.
89 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 628 (D.N.J. 2014).
90 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 628–29 (collecting cases).
91 Int’l Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1072 (FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(n) (providing that the FTC may consider established public policies in determining whether
an act of practice is unfair).
92 Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison, Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)) (“[T]he Supreme Court left no doubt that the FTC had the
authority to prohibit conduct that, although legally proper, was unfair to the public.”).
85

SUMER

R
R
R
R
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It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.93
Thus, it is the FTC that is responsible, subject to judicial review, for
identifying unfair trade practices.94
In its statement on unfairness, the FTC cited the Supreme Court’s
explicit recognition that unfairness need not be defined ex ante, instead growing through evolution.95 The Court stated the term unfairness “belongs to that class of phrases which do not admit of precise
definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived
at by what this court elsewhere has called ‘the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.’ ”96 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated with respect to unfairness;
The Commission has a wide latitude in such matters; its powers are not confined to such practices as would be unlawful
before it acted; they are more than procedural; its duty in
part at any rate, is to discover and to make explicit those
unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience
of the community may progressively develop.97
The opinions in Wyndham support this view. Judge Salas rejected Wyndham’s argument that the FTC does not have the authority
to regulate data security.98 Instead, Judge Salas concluded that the
FTC has broad power under Section 5 to support its exercise of authority, and the context-specific data security statutes simply enhance
data security authority in certain contexts by removing consumer inH.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.).
See id.
95 UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT, supra note 85, at 1072 (citing FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643, 648 (1931)); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) (“Neither the language
nor the history of the Act suggests that Congress intended to confine the forbidden methods to
fixed and unyielding categories.”)).
96 Raladam Co., 283 U.S. at 648 (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104
(1878)).
97 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936) rev’d on other grounds, 302
U.S. 112 (1937). Courts have explicitly given significant deference to the FTC’s interpretations
of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice. See EARL KINTNER & WILLIAM
KRATZKE, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 89–90 (“[T]he courts have declared an intention to give
wide discretion to the Federal Trade Commission to declare acts or practices unfair, but certainly
this is not a discretion which the Commission cannot ever overstep, notwithstanding the increasing deference to agency interpretative skills.” (footnote omitted)).
98 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612 (D.N.J. 2014).
93
94
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jury requirements, granting the FTC additional enforcement powers
that it otherwise lacks, and affirmatively compelling (rather than
merely authorizing) the FTC to use its authority in particular ways.99
Judge Salas wrote that Wyndham “fails to explain how the FTC’s
unfairness authority over data security would lead to a result that is
incompatible with more recent legislation and thus would ‘plainly contradict congressional policy.’ ”100 In other words, because Congress’s
actions all seem to complement, not preclude, the FTC’s authority
over data security, this dispute is not similar to the FDA’s repudiated
authority over the tobacco products at issue in Brown & Williamson,
as was argued by Wyndham.101
In an order denying LabMD’s motion to dismiss, Commissioner
Joshua Wright, writing for a unanimous Commission, confirmed the
FTC’s authority to enforce the FTC Act by adjudicating whether data
security practices are unfair.102 The order stated, “Congress, in enacting Section 5(n), confirmed its intent to allow the Commission to continue to ascertain, on a case-by-case basis, which specific practices
should be condemned as ‘unfair.’ ”103 Citing a D.C. Circuit case, the
Commission noted that “to this day, ‘Congress has not at any time
withdrawn the broad discretionary authority originally granted the
Commission in 1914 to define unfair practices on a flexible, incremental basis.’ ”104 It observed that:
The Commission and the federal courts have been applying
these three “unfairness” factors for decades and, on that basis, have found a wide range of acts or practices that satisfy
the applicable criteria to be “unfair,” even though—like the
data security practices alleged in this case—“there is nothing
in Section 5 explicitly authorizing the FTC to directly regulate” such practices.105
The concept of unfairness is thus quite intentionally broad and
subject to refinement over time. Instead of specific categories, the
FTC’s unfairness authority is limited to instances where there is an
99
100

See id. at 612–13.
Id. at 612 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 139

(2000)).
101

Id. at 612–13.

102

Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 1–2.

103

Id. at 5.

104

Id. (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

105

Id.

R
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actual unavoidable harm or likelihood thereof, which is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.106
An exceptionally wide range of activities has been included in the
FTC’s unfairness and regulatory efforts, including creating a physical
danger to children,107 high pressure sales environments,108 the unilateral imposition of fees in breach of a service contract,109 and failure to
disclose substantial risk of physical injury from hazardous exercise
equipment.110 Stephen Calkins stated, “[m]odern Commission unfairness cases fall into five categories: (1) theft and the facilitation thereof
(clearly the leading category); (2) breaking or causing the breaking of
other laws; (3) using insufficient care; (4) interfering with the exercise
of consumer rights; and (5) advertising that promotes unsafe practices.”111 Many of the alleged unfair actions seek to take advantage of
vulnerable consumers, making exploitation the locus of many unfairness allegations.112
Thus, commentators, the Commission, the courts, and even Congress itself have repeatedly confirmed that Congress gave the FTC
very broad and general regulatory authority by design to allow for a
more nimble and evolutionary approach to the regulation of consumer
protection.

106 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 5.

See Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16, 19 (1973) (consent order) (requiring respondent to
cease distributing free-sample razor blades in such a way that they could come into the hands of
small children).
107

108 See Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302, 303–05 (7th Cir. 1961) (upholding Commission’s cease and desist order when seller’s servicemen dismantled home furnaces and then
refused to reassemble them until the consumers had agreed to buy services or replacement
parts).
109 See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding Commission cease and desist order when company unilaterally breached “over 200,000 contracts with its customers”).
110 See Consumer Direct Inc., 113 F.T.C. 923, 928 (1990) (consent order); FTC Charges
Fitness Quest, Inc. with Making Deceptive Claims and Failing to Disclose a Safety Risk from Use
of Its “Gut Buster” Exercise Device, CASEWATCH (Aug. 27, 2006), http://www.casewatch.org/ftc/
news/1990/gutbust.shtml.
111

Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1962 (2000).

See, e.g., FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1934) (finding unfairness
where an action “exploit[s] consumers, children, who are unable to protect themselves”); Unfair
or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354–55 (July 2, 1964), quoted in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
112
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2. Overlapping Domains
To what extent is the FTC’s enforcement authority limited when
it overlaps with other laws and regulations? Critics charge that the
FTC cannot intrude upon the regulatory space of other agencies and
that it cannot use Section 5 when there are more specific statutes dealing with a particular issue.113 This argument, however, is not consistent with how the FTC has operated for nearly a century. Moreover,
if the FTC’s Section 5 power were to stop at any overlapping regulatory domain, the result would be a confusing, contentious, and unworkable regulatory system with boundaries constantly in dispute.
In the early days of FTC data protection enforcement, the possibility of overlap was diminished because there were many fewer laws
regulating data protection issues.114 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970 (“FCRA”)115 already gave the FTC the authority to regulate the
credit reporting industry.116 New data protection laws and regulation
began to emerge after the FTC started applying Section 5 to data protection in the mid-1990s.117 For example, the privacy requirements of
the Administrative Simplification rules of Title II of HIPAA went into
effect in 2001, with compliance required as of 2003.118 The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009
(“HITECH Act”)119 added a data breach notification requirement to
HIPAA.120 In many circumstances, the FTC did not encroach upon
existing enforcement authority of other agencies; these agencies acquired enforcement authority after the FTC had already been active
in the area.121 It is important to note that when Congress passed
HIPAA and later on when it passed the HITECH Act amending
113 See, e.g., FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The appellants
claimed that, because the regulation of their advertising practices was subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) or the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the FTC lacked authority to investigate.”).
114 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 590–94.
115 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 601–22, 84 Stat. 1114,
1128–36 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x).
116 Id. § 621(a), 84 Stat. at 1134–35.
117 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 598–99.
118 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,462, 82,787 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); HIPAA Administrative Simplification Statute and Rules, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
119 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001–13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–79 (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
120 Id. § 13402, 123 Stat. at 260; see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 (2014).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 117–20.
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HIPAA, it did not include any provision restricting the FTC from enforcing against HIPAA-regulated entities. This omission is particularly salient for the HITECH Act of 2009, where many of the
amendments to HIPAA involved provisions increasing HHS’s enforcement powers and penalties, as well as the scope of HHS’s enforcement—such as authorizing HHS to enforce against most entities
that receive HIPAA-regulated data from a healthcare provider or
other “covered entity” under HIPAA.122
Although several laws gave the FTC additional enforcement
powers, these powers were extensions beyond Section 5. For example,
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”)123
gave the FTC direct authority to enforce the statute’s mandates for
websites directed to children under thirteen.124 Under COPPA, the
FTC was also granted rulemaking authority, which it lacked for the
most part under Section 5.125 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”)126 gave the FTC direct authority over data protection in
the financial services industry.127 Previously, many entities in this industry (such as banks) were explicitly excluded from the FTC’s Section 5 authority. Under GLBA, Congress gave the FTC rulemaking
powers.128 Thus, Congress did not pass these data protection laws to
give the FTC powers that it might have had under Section 5. Rather,
it gave the FTC powers that augmented and extended what it was
doing under Section 5. Had Congress thought that the FTC was overreaching in its early Section 5 enforcement, the passage of these statutes would have been a logical time to reign in the FTC to these
specific domains. Instead, Congress did the opposite, and the result of
these laws was to give the FTC a greater foothold in the field of data
protection.
Given the breadth of Section 5 and its applicability to nearly
every industry, as well as the rise of new privacy legislation, some
overlap naturally developed. Does the FTC lose its power to regulate
in these newly colonized areas? Does FTC regulation present
problems of regulatory redundancy and inconsistency? What is the
proper scope of FTC power in an area of overlap?
42 U.S.C. § 17934(a), (c) (2012).
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2012).
124 Id. §§ 6501(1), 6505(a).
125 Id. § 6505(d).
126 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.).
127 Id. §§ 504, 505, 522, 113 Stat. at 1439–41, 1447–48.
128 Id. § 504, 113 Stat. at 1439.
122
123
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The most prominent argument that the FTC loses regulatory authority in an area of overlap is Wyndham’s contention regarding the
FTC’s authority over data security.129 As discussed above, Wyndham
claimed that because Congress granted specific data security powers
to the FTC in the GLBA and COPPA, and because other statutes regulate data security (such as FCRA), this is a clear indication that the
FTC lacks general authority to regulate data security.130
However, there is simply no textual support for the categorical
exclusion of data security, or for that matter any single class of actions, absent a specific abdication of responsibilities with a cooperating or overlapping agency. Congress has yet to act in any explicit way
to repeal the FTC’s authority over data security. To the contrary,
when Congress has enacted laws that involve data security, such as
GLBA and COPPA, Congress has augmented the FTC’s powers by
adding data security rulemaking authority.131
The FTC was created to have intentionally general and expansive
jurisdiction.132 Instead of listing every area that the FTC’s jurisdiction
covers, the FTC Act specifically lists the areas it does not cover, including banks, savings and loan institutions, Federal credit unions,
common carriers, air carriers, meat packers, and non-profit entities.133
In its order denying LabMD’s motion to dismiss, the Commission
stated, “the FTC Act makes clear that, when Congress wants to exempt a particular category of entities or activities from the Commission’s authority, it knows how to do so explicitly.”134 Section 5(a)(2)
of the FTC Act contains a list of carve-outs where FTC jurisdiction
does not apply, and Congress did not amend that list when it passed
HIPAA or other data protection laws.135
Section 5’s inevitable overlap with other statutes and regulatory
domains is necessary and manageable. The FTC routinely shares regulatory authority with other administrative agencies. With respect to
FTC jurisdiction, one court has stated, “[b]ecause we live in ‘an age of
overlapping and concurring regulatory jurisdiction,’ a court must proceed with the utmost caution before concluding that one agency may
See Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 37, at 1.
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 611 & n.4 (D.N.J. 2014).
131 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 602–04 (discussing “expansion” of FTC’s privacy
jurisdiction).
132 See supra Part I.B.1.
133 15 U.S.C. §§ 13c, 45(a)(2) (2012). Nonprofit entities are ostensibly not engaged in
“commerce.”
134 Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 12.
135 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)).
129

R
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not regulate merely because another may.”136 Indeed, concurring and
overlapping jurisdiction between administrative agencies and between
agencies and statutes is not only common, but is often desirable.137
Jacob Gersen has argued, “[a] statute that allocates authority to multiple government entities relies on competing agents as a mechanism for
managing agency problems. Giving authority to multiple agencies and
allowing them to compete against each other can bring policy closer to
the preferences of Congress than would delegation to a single
agent.”138
Consumer protection is involved in so many different other domains because the range of commerce is so vast. Many different statutes and administrative agencies inevitably overlap with the FTC’s
potential reach, yet courts have explicitly found this overlap not to
curtail the FTC’s jurisdiction.139 For example, the FTC has worked
with the FDA for over forty years regarding certain kinds of advertising for food and drugs.140 Additionally, in examining FTC’s deceptive
advertising overlap with the Commodities Exchange Act and Investment Advisors Act (“IAA”), one court stated, “[t]he proscriptions of
the IAA are not diminished or confused merely because investment
advisers must also avoid that which the FTC Act proscribes. And,
because these statutes are ‘capable of co-existence,’ it becomes the
136 FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (quoting
Thompson Med. Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); see also FTC v. Cement Inst.,
333 U.S. 683, 694–95 (1948) (“We find nothing to justify a holding that the filing of a Sherman
Act suit by the Attorney General requires the termination of these Federal Trade Commission
proceedings.”); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“It therefore appears
that a court should approach gingerly a claim that one agency has conclusively determined an
issue later analyzed from another perspective by an agency with different substantive
jurisdiction.”).
137 See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 208 (“[S]tatutes that parcel out authority or jurisdiction to multiple
agencies may be the norm, rather than an exception.”); id. at 203 (“Because overlapping and
underlapping jurisdictional assignment can produce desirable incentives for administrative agencies, statutes of this sort are useful tools for managing principal-agent problems inherent in
delegation.”).
138

Id. at 212.

139

See, e.g., Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d at 593.

See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Trade Commission and the
Food and Drug Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539, 18,539 (Sept. 16, 1971); Thompson Med.
Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“We find no evidence in the regulatory scheme
that Congress has fashioned for over-the-counter medications that the FTC is indefinitely barred
from all regulatory authority over drug advertising while the FDA conducts its comprehensive
review of drug safety. Nowhere in the case law or in the FTC’s grant of authority is there even a
hint that the FTC’s jurisdiction is so constricted. To the contrary, the cases recognize that ours is
an age of overlapping and concurring regulatory jurisdiction.”).
140
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duty of this court ‘to regard each as effective’—at least absent clear
congressional intent to the contrary.”141
The FTC has regularly “double dipped” when it considered activity in violation of both a statute over which the FTC has jurisdiction
and Section 5.142 For example, almost half of the FTC complaints alleging violations of COPPA also contained an allegation of deceptive
trade practices, a Section 5 violation.143 Almost all of the FTC complaints alleging violations of the GLBA also contained an allegation of
deceptive or unfair trade practices.144 These practices have not reKen Roberts Co., 276 F.3d at 593 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 643.
143 See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, & Other Relief at 2, United
States v. Path, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00448-RS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013); Complaint for Civil Penalties,
Permanent Injunction, & Other Equitable Relief at 13, United States v. Artist Arena LLC, No.
1:12-cv-07386-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction,
& Other Equitable Relief at 1–2, United States v. Rockyou, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-1487-SI, (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 27, 2012); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, & Other Relief at 4, United States v.
Godwin, No. 1:11-cv-3846-JOF (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2012); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, & Other Relief at 4, United States v. Playdom, Inc., No. SACV11-0724-AG(ANx) (C.D.
Cal. May 24, 2011); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, & Other Relief at 1, 7–8, United
States v. Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., Case 09 Civ. 8864 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009); Complaint
for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, & Other Relief at 1, 5–6, United States v. Am. Pop Corn Co., No.
C02-4008DEO (N.D. Iowa Feb. 14, 2002); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, & Other
Relief at 7–9, United States v. Lisa Frank, Inc., No. 01-1516-A (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2001); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, & Other Relief at 8–10, United States v. Bigmailbox.com,
Inc., No. 01-605-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2001); First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction
& Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS (D. Mass. July 21,
2000). It is not always clear if the FTC is alleging a violation of COPPA, a violation of Section 5,
or both. For example, in United States v. W3 Innovations, LLC, No. 5:11-cv-03958-PSG (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 8, 2011), the FTC initially alleges that a violation of the COPPA rule constitutes an
unfair or deceptive trade practice, yet only appears to bring one count of violating the COPPA
rule against the defendant. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, & Other
Equitable Relief at 1–2, 7, W3 Innovations, No. 5:11-cv-03958-PSG; see also Complaint for Civil
Penalties, Injunction, & Other Relief at 2, 8, United States v. Industrious Kid, Inc., CV No. 080639 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2008) (alleging that “Pursuant to Section 18(d)(3) of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3), a violation of the [COPPA] Rule constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or
practice”); Complaint at 9, United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 6853 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 11, 2006) (same).
Contrast this with other FTC complaints where both the COPPA rule and Section 5 were
alleged to have been violated. See, e.g., Complaint for Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction,
& Other Relief at 9–10, Playdom, No. SACV 11-0724-AG(ANx) (alleging violations of COPPA
and Section 5 of the FTC Act independent of COPPA violation).
144 See Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief at 10–11, FTC v.
Sun Spectrum Commc’ns Org., Inc., No. 03-8110 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0323032/031202cmp0323032.pdf; Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at
12–19, FTC v. Corp. Mktg. Sols., Inc., No. CIV-02 1256 PHX RCB (D. Ariz. July 18, 2002), http:/
/www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/cmscmp.pdf; First Amended Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at 6, FTC v. Garrett, Civil Action No.: H-01-1255 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2002), http://ftc
.gov/os/2002/03/discreetdatacmplnt.pdf; Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at
141
142
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sulted thus far in any congressional backlash. Congress has had ample
time to curtail clear instances of overlap but has not done so. As we
noted earlier, the most significant example is the HITECH Act of
2009, where Congress directly addressed HHS’s enforcement power
and could have limited that power exclusively to HHS.145 Interestingly, Congress chose to allow for more entities to enforce by authorizing state attorneys general to enforce HIPAA.146
Although there is overlap, it has not resulted in significant inconsistencies or confusion. The FTC and HHS often coordinate enforcement actions for violations that implicate both HIPAA and the FTC
Act.147 Moreover, as we noted in a previous work, the data security
standards that the FTC has developed are quite consistent with those
in the HIPAA Security Rule.148
The FTC’s jurisprudence overlaps substantially with torts and
contracts as well. For example, the tort-law analog to deception under
Section 5 is the tort of fraud.149 The FTC’s enforcement of promises
made in privacy policies in many ways overlaps the law of contract
and promissory estoppel, although FTC enforcement has proven to be
much more effective than these doctrines.150
56, FTC v. Guzzetta, No. 01-2335(DGT) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/
pretextingsmartdatacomplaint.pdf; Complaint at 3, Franklin’s Budget Car Sales, Inc., FTC File
No. 102-3094(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023094/121026franklinautomallcmpt
.pdf; Complaint at 5, Premier Capital Lending, Inc., FTC File No. 072-3004 (Dec. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Premier Capital Lending Complaint], http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723004/
081206pclcmpt.pdf; Complaint at 3–4, Goal Fin., LLC, FTC File No. 072-3013 (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723013/080415complaint.pdf; Complaint at 4–5, Nations Title
Agency, Inc. FTC File No. 052-3117 (June 19, 2006) [hereinafter Nations Title Agency Complaint], http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523117/0523117NationsTitle_Complaint.pdf; Complaint at
2–3, Superior Mortg. Corp., FTC File No. 052-3136 (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523136/051216comp0523136.pdf.
145 See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d) (2012); Health Information Privacy: State Attorneys General,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/sag/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
147 See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5579 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
148 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 651–55.
149 Compare id. at 599 (“An ‘unfair or deceptive’ act or practice is a material ‘representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.’ ”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977) (defining fraudulent misrepresentation as a “misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance
upon it”).
150 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 589, 596–97.
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Thus, the FTC’s data protection authority is not a unique case of
overlap, but one example among many instances of overlap that understandably arise given the breadth of the FTC’s Section 5 authority.
Moreover, given the absence of a federal omnibus data protection
statute, the basic U.S. approach to data protection is to have a series
of different laws to regulate different corners of the economy.151
Modern industry is complex and does not follow neatly designed regulatory boundaries, especially when these laws are passed over the
course of decades. Today, companies dance nimbly between different
economic sectors. A technology company can enter the healthcare
domain, and can have components that fall into financial services and
other arenas. Regulatory overlap is bound to happen as industries
shift to evolve with a rapidly changing economy.
More broadly, a rigid prohibition on regulatory overlap would
prove quite challenging and chaotic. Agencies would clash in carving
out contiguous borders when their regulatory scopes overlap.152 And
these borders would have to be adjusted with each new law that creates potential overlap.153 In sum, the idea that potential regulatory
overlap disqualifies the FTC from regulating data security is not supported in theory or in practice. The FTC regularly manages its concurring and overlapping jurisdiction in ways that allow it to fill gaps as
well as refine its theories of regulation.154
3. Adequate Notice and the Gradual Development of Rules
Critics of the FTC’s approach to data protection have claimed
that the FTC has failed to provide proper notice in advance of what
companies must do to avoid liability.155 They contend that the FTC
simply waits until after a data breach occurs and then announces new
data security rules and standards that the companies suffering the
See id. at 587.
See Gersen, supra note 137, at 210–11 (describing problems inherent in congressional
grants of “overlapping” jurisdiction).
153 See id. at 208.
154 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 676 (arguing that FTC has “created a body of
common law doctrines”).
155 See Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 37, at 10–11; Wyndham Amicus Brief,
supra note 72, at 7–9; Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 18, at 10–12; Respondent
LabMD, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice & to Stay Admin. Proceedings at
22–28, LabMD, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9357 (F.T.C. Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/131112respondlabmdmodiscomplaintdatyadminproceed.pdf; Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Another Round in the Chamber: FTC Data Security
Requirements and the Fair Notice Doctrine, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2013, 1, 18–19; Scott, supra
note 6, at 170–71; Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 20 at 675–76.
151
152
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breach should have followed.156 This practice, the critics charge, fails
to provide companies with sufficient advance warning about what is
required in order to provide acceptable data security.157
Companies like LabMD and Wyndham have argued that the FTC
should have to create rules after a formal process, rather than rely on
creating rules case-by-case, which the companies claim fails to give the
requisite amount of notice. LabMD argued in its motion to dismiss
that “the FTC admits that it has not prescribed regulations or legislative rules under Section 5 establishing patient-information (or any
other) data-security standards that have the force of law. . . . The
FTC’s refusal to issue regulations is wrongful and makes no sense.”158
Wyndham stated in support of its argument that it lacked fair notice
that “if the FTC can regulate data security at all, it must do so through
published rules that give regulated parties fair notice of what the law
requires.”159 An implication of this argument is that the FTC is engaging in a form of rulemaking through its cases, and making rules is
beyond its powers in this area because the FTC lacks specialized
rulemaking authority under Section 5.160 Moreover, another implication of this argument is that rules are better when created according to
a formal rulemaking process, where stakeholders can submit comments, where rules can be worked out more systematically, and where
there is greater notice.161
156

See Wyndham Amicus Brief, supra note 72, at 7–8.

157

See id.

158 Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice & to Stay Admin. Proceedings, supra note 155, at 23–24.
159

Wyndham Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 18, at 7.

The FTC has only Magnuson-Moss rulemaking authority, which is so procedurally burdensome that it is largely ineffective. Beth DeSimone and Amy Mudge articulate why the
Magnuson-Moss rules are largely ineffective:
160

Right now, the FTC is constrained in its rulemaking by the so-called “MagnusonMoss” rules. These rules require the FTC Staff to engage in an industry-wide investigation, prepare draft staff reports, propose a rule, and engage in a series of
public hearings, including cross-examination opportunities prior to issuing a final
rule in any area. These processes are so burdensome that the FTC has not engaged
in a Magnuson-Moss rule-making in 32 years.
Beth DeSimone & Amy Mudge, Is Congress Putting the FTC on Steroids?, SELLERBEWARE
BLOG (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2010/04/is-congress-puttingthe-ftc-on-steroids.html; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, OPERATING MANUAL § 7.2.3.1, https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch07rulemaking.pdf
(“Section 202(a) of Magnuson-Moss provides that the Commission’s § 18 authority is its only
authority to promulgate rules respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”).
161 See, e.g., Nat’l Petrol. Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 682–83 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(favoring formal rulemaking over policymaking via case-by-case adjudication because rulemak-
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However, this argument and entire line of reasoning misunderstands firmly established reasonableness approaches that obligate
companies to reasonably follow industry standards. Many critics seem
to want a “check list” of data security practices that will, in essence,
provide a safe harbor in all contexts. Yet data security changes too
quickly and is far too dependent upon context to be reduced to a onesize-fits-all checklist.162
Instead, the FTC has opted to defer to industry to set the appropriate standards for good data security practices by utilizing a “reasonableness” standard.163 In a statement issued in conjunction with
the FTC’s fiftieth data security settlement, the FTC stated,
The touchstone of the Commission’s approach to data security is reasonableness: a company’s data security measures
must be reasonable and appropriate in light of the sensitivity
and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and
complexity of its business, and the cost of available tools to
improve security and reduce vulnerabilities.164
Almost all data security regulatory regimes that use a reasonableness standard include four critical aspects necessary for data security
to be reasonable:
• Identification of assets and risk;
• Data minimization;
• Administrative, technical and physical safeguards; and
• Data breach response plans.165
These factors are reflected in the FTC’s data protection jurisprudence as well as the FTC’s Statement accompanying its fiftieth data
security settlement.166
ing gives advance notice of required conduct and allows stakeholders to offer relevant perspectives on proposed regulation).
162 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 2 (2014), http://
www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf (explaining
benefits of framework approach for organizations that will continue to face “unique risks”).
163 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA
SECURITY SETTLEMENT 1 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf.
164 Id.
165 See id. (discussing “basic principles” of reasonable data-security practices).
166 Id. The Commission stated:
These materials explain that, while there is no single solution, such a program follows certain basic principles. First, companies should know what consumer information they have and what employees or third parties have access to it.
Understanding how information moves into, through, and out of a business is essential to assessing its security vulnerabilities. Second, companies should limit the
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A reasonableness standard is already one of the most established
and proven touchstones for regulating data security. For example,
Maryland requires that “a business that owns or licenses personal information of an individual residing in the State [must] implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices that are appropriate to the nature of the personal information owned or licensed and
the nature and size of the business and its operations.”167 In California, “[a] business that owns or licenses personal information about a
California resident [must] implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”168 There are a number
of other states that also require “reasonable” data security practices.169 Regulations under FCRA require that certain employers
information they collect and retain based on their legitimate business needs so that
needless storage of data does not create unnecessary risks of unauthorized access to
the data. Third, businesses should protect the information they maintain by assessing risks and implementing protections in certain key areas—physical security, electronic security, employee training, and oversight of service providers. Fourth,
companies should properly dispose of information that they no longer need. Finally, companies should have a plan in place to respond to security incidents,
should they occur.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (LexisNexis 2013).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West 2009).
169 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b) (2011) (“A person or business that acquires, owns,
or licenses personal information about an Arkansas resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect
the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.210(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (“A data collector that maintains records which contain personal information of a resident of this State shall implement and
maintain reasonable security measures to protect those records from unauthorized access, acquisition, destruction, use, modification or disclosure.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-64(a)–(b) (2013) (requiring “reasonable measures,” including: “(1) Implementing and monitoring compliance with
policies and procedures that require the burning, pulverizing, or shredding of papers containing
personal information so that information cannot be practicably read or reconstructed. (2) Implementing and monitoring compliance with policies and procedures that require the destruction
or erasure of electronic media and other nonpaper media containing personal information so
that the information cannot practicably be read or reconstructed. (3) Describing procedures
relating to the adequate destruction or proper disposal of personal records as official policy in
the writings of the business entity.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(1)–(2) (West 2011) (providing that “[a]ny person that owns, maintains or otherwise possesses data that includes a consumer’s personal information that is used in the course of the person’s business, vocation,
occupation or volunteer activities must develop, implement and maintain reasonable safeguards
to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of the personal information, including disposal of the data,” and explicitly recognizing compliance with GLB or HIPAA data security standards as “reasonable”); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-49.2-2(2) (West 2006) (“A business that
owns or licenses computerized unencripted personal information about a Rhode Island resident
167
168
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“properly dispose” of customer information by taking “reasonable
measures” to protect against the unauthorized access and possession
of the information.170 Under HIPAA, holders of protected health
identifiers must use “reasonable and appropriate” means to ensure
that administrative, physical, and technical safeguards are in place to
protect data and control access to it; and that risk assessments are
conducted and security policies and procedures are documented.171
Reasonableness standards permeate many traditional legal concepts. Many contractual obligations are also hitched to reasonableness172 and the entire tort of negligence is largely a duty to act
reasonably under the circumstances.173 Indeed, this fact was explicitly
acknowledged by FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright, writing for a
unanimous Commission in denying LabMD’s motion to dismiss:
LabMD’s due process claim is particularly untenable when
viewed against the backdrop of the common law of negligence. Every day, courts and juries subject companies to tort
liability for violating uncodified standards of care, and the
contexts in which they make those fact-specific judgments
are as varied and fast-changing as the world of commerce
and technology itself.174
As Commissioner Wright noted, tort liability can be as unpredictable as FTC enforcement, and torts can involve “compensatory and
even punitive damages.”175 Despite these facts, “it is well-established
that the common law of negligence does not violate due process simply because the standards of care are uncodified.”176
shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-201(1) (LexisNexis
2013) (“Any person who conducts business in the state and maintains personal information shall
implement and maintain reasonable procedures to: (a) prevent unlawful use or disclosure of
personal information collected or maintained in the regular course of business; and (b) destroy,
or arrange for the destruction of, records containing personal information that are not to be
retained by the person.”).
170

16 C.F.R. § 682.3(a) (2014).

171

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306–.316 (2014).

See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 786 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (discussing reasonableness in the context of a claim of misrepresentation).
172

173 See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In
negligence suits, for example, the question is what would a ‘reasonable person’ do ‘under the
same or similar circumstances.’ ”).
174

Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 17.

175

Id.

176

Id.
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Reasonableness is also the locus for Fourth Amendment analysis
of searches.177 Of course, for certain circumstances, a set of rules can
be a more effective regulatory tool. In the debate between rules and
standards, between more systematic and case-by-case legal development, there is no universal winner. The U.S. system of law consists of
a mix of these approaches.178
In a common law system—or any system where matters are decided case-by-case and there is an attempt at maintaining consistency
across decisions, any reasonableness standard will evolve into something more akin to a rule with specifics over time.179 Indeed, any
broad standard will follow this evolutionary trajectory.180 Such a developmental pattern is inevitable if prior decisions have any kind of
precedential effect or the functional equivalent of precedent.181 The
standard will start out rather broadly, but each new case will bring a
new application of that standard to a concrete situation.182 From these
collected specific applications, the details start to accumulate around
the standard’s skeletal frame. Each case typically fills in something.
Of course, if these decisions did not have any effect on future decisions, then the standard would remain in its pristine skeletal state.
But in the U.S. system of law, prior cases, including interpretations
and applications of statutes and regulations, are not ignored. In contrast to civil law systems, in common law systems such as the United
States, there is an overarching and very powerful norm for consistency
across decisions and to avoid deviating from prior decisions.183 While
some initial uncertainty might be the present at the outset, the clarity
provided by each additional legal action virtually guarantees ever increasing determinism for those already charged with a reasonable adherence to commonly shared industry standards.
The FTC is not exceeding its authority because this developmental pattern is practically inevitable and quite predictable given the
clarity offered by incorporation of generally accepted industry practices and the wiggle room provided by requiring reasonable, but not
177 Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (2011) (“The Court’s opinions emphasize
that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness’ . . . .”).
178 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 619–20.
179 See Allan C. Hutchinson, Work-in-Progress: Evolution and Common Law, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 253, 254 (2005).
180 See id. at 254–57.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 254.
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strict, adherence to those practices.184 Thus, standards evolve in a developmental pattern typical of the common law and the product of
adherence to precedent, consistency in decisions, and case-by-case adjudication over time. If this pattern were not present, then the FTC
would be acting inconsistently, ignoring previous actions, or reaching
too far beyond particular cases. In fact, the FTC has been quite clear
and consistent in its approach. It has not developed theories that are
at odds with previous complaints, nor does it dramatically lurch in
dramatic, unpredictable or haphazard ways.
With or without rulemaking authority, it is inevitable that the
FTC will be developing rules. This is just the byproduct of the FTC
enforcing broad standards, memorializing how it is interpreting those
standards in particular cases, and being consistent with its prior interpretations.185 The FTC has not been engaging in rulemaking in disguise any more than when a court interpreting a statute over time is
engaging in judicial legislation. This is just a common law system at
work. This dynamic exists in many areas of the law. The norms and
practices of the common law, such as adherence to precedent, apply to
statutory and constitutional interpretation as well.186
The district court in Wyndham affirmed the FTC’s case-by-case
approach in the face of a fair notice challenge, noting that “Circuit
Courts of Appeal have affirmed FTC unfairness actions in a variety of
contexts without preexisting rules or regulations specifically addressing the conduct-at-issue.”187 Although the court agreed that laws must
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required, it was not
convinced that regulations are the only means of providing sufficient
fair notice.188 Judge Salas seemed to understand that the rapidly
evolving nature of data security made the FTC’s analogies to the
184

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 163.

R

See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 621 (D.N.J. 2014) (“Indeed,
‘the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which the courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’ [Wyndham]
Hotels and Resorts’ argument that consent orders do not carry the force of law, therefore, misses
the mark.” (citation omitted)).
185

186 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 620 (“Indeed, the meaning of many provisions of
constitutional and statutory law cannot be understood simply by looking to their text—the body
of judicial decisions offering a gloss on those provisions is an essential component that must be
consulted.”).
187 Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 618 (citing FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1153, 1155–59
(9th Cir. 2010); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1191, 1193–95 (10th Cir. 2009)).
188

See id. at 619.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-6\GWN614.txt

2264

unknown

Seq: 35

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5-JAN-16

12:13

[Vol. 83:2230

NLRB and OSHA persuasive as models for bringing enforcement actions without issuing particularized prohibitions.189
Perhaps more importantly, the court noted that “the contour of
an unfairness claim in the data-security context, like any other, is necessarily ‘flexible’ such that the FTC can apply Section 5 ‘to the facts of
particular cases arising out of unprecedented situations.’ ”190 The
court validated a reasonableness approach built upon industry standards and shaped by administrative actions.191 The court quoted General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,192 noting that “the rulings, interpretations
and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance.”193
The district court stated that Wyndham’s argument regarding the
intolerable vagueness of Section 5 unfairness “ignores that, in addition
to various sources of guidance for measuring reasonableness, a statutorily-defined standard exists for asserting an unfairness claim.”194
The court also noted the illogical and unacceptable practical consequences of a mandate for specific rules before bringing a complaint,
stating “the FTC would have to cease bringing all unfairness actions
without first proscribing particularized prohibitions—a result that is in
direct contradiction with the flexibility necessarily inherent in Section
5 of the FTC Act.”195
Our previous research demonstrates the validity of the court’s
conclusion that the FTC’s interpretations of the FTC Act in administrative adjudications provide sufficient guidance.196 For example, at
the time we wrote this Article, there were over forty FTC complaints
and consent decrees regarding data security and we reviewed all of
them.197 When reviewed in their totality, far from being vague and
arbitrary, we were able to compile a list of specific security practices
189 See id. at 620 (“[G]iven the rapidly-evolving nature of data security, the Court is not
persuaded by [Wyndham] Hotels and Resorts’ attempt to undermine the FTC’s analogies involving the National Labor Relations Act and OSHA on the grounds that precedent is lacking.”).
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
193 Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 621 (quoting Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 141–42).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 619–25 (arguing that the FTC settlements are
akin to common law and provide guidance to practitioners).
197 See id. at 628 n.211.
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that the FTC has deemed as inadequate.198 Moreover, most of these
bad practices are ones that clearly run afoul of industry standards or
other regulation.199 Like the data security requirements of HIPAA
and GLBA,200 the FTC has given notice through settlements and adjudications that failure to have reasonable physical, technical, and administrative safeguards constitutes an unfair trade practice.
Some critics protest that only detailed rules could provide the
kind of guidance industry needs to protect personal data,201 but centuries of common law development prove otherwise. The common law
has achieved a sufficient specificity, predictability, and clarity that can
rival that of statutes.
A common law style of rule development has certain benefits.
There is flexibility to adapt to new situations. The FTC can wait until
a consensus around specific standards develops in the industry and
then codify them as this happens. With data protection, the norms
and standards have been developing significantly over the past few
decades, and there has not been consensus around a complete rule
set.202 Rather than wait decades for such an exhaustive consensus to
develop, the FTC’s case-by-case approach has allowed it to engage in
the functional equivalent of codifying those rules and standards that
have achieved sufficient consensus.203 The common law style recognizes that Rome was not built in a day; and that one need not have a
complete blueprint to begin building.
II. DEFINING

THE

FTC’S ROLE

IN

DATA PROTECTION

Thus far, we have argued that the FTC has broad data protection
enforcement power, and that the critics are wrong in the constraints
they propose on this power. In this Part, we move beyond descriptive
See id. at 651–55.
See id. at 656.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 118–28.
201 See, e.g., Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The
Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1287, 1314–15 (2014) (arguing in favor of formal policy statement).
202 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 657 (“With regard to privacy, what constitutes
good practice is more in dispute, although there are certainly some practices about which consensus has developed.”); NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SUMMARY OF THE PRIVACY ENGINEERING WORKSHOP AT HE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY: APRIL
9–10, 2014, at 1 (2014), http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/privacy-workshop-summary052114.pdf (“In the security field, risk management models, along with technical standards and
best practices, are key components of improving security. . . . To date, the privacy field has
lagged behind in the development of analogous components.”).
203 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 662.
198
199

R

R
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claims about the scope of FTC data protection power to the normative
issues. Should the FTC have such broad powers in this area? Is the
FTC being too aggressive in regulating data protection? Should it pull
back? Or should it expand its foothold in this area?
We contend that the FTC should not only have broad data protection enforcement powers, but that it also should be exercising these
powers more robustly. The FTC should enforce more expansively,
embrace consensus norms more quickly, and take more of a leadership role in the development of privacy norms and standards.
The FTC has established a foundation for being the U.S. data
protection authority. We argue that the FTC should build aggressively on this foundation to take on this role more fully.
For the most part, the FTC has been quite conservative in its data
protection enforcement, more of a norm-codifier than a normmaker.204 Thus far, the FTC has developed its jurisprudence in a measured and modest way.205 It is time for the FTC to become less conservative in its approach. Rapid technological change continues to
vex courts and lawmakers and leave consumers vulnerable to privacy
harms. U.S. privacy law is a chaotic jumble of different laws, with
gaps and inconsistencies, and the U.S. approach is at odds with most
other countries in the world, which have broader and more omnibus
privacy laws.206 A broad privacy law spanning most industries would
be politically impractical given the way Congress is structured as well
as the current stalemate in Congress. There is little hope of Congress
passing any privacy-related legislation anytime soon, as demonstrated
by regularly unsuccessful legislative proposals.207 The FTC is one of
the best hopes for guiding U.S. privacy law to a more coherent and
stable regulatory system.

Id. at 662, 676.
See supra Part I.B.3.
206 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 587.
207 See Tim Lisko, 112th Privacy Legislation, PRIVACYWONK (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www
.privacywonk.net/2011/08/112th-privacy-legislation.php (detailing federal legislation proposed in
the 112th Congress); Craig Hoffman, Online Privacy and Data Security Legislation Update–2011
Year in Review, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/
federal-legislation/online-privacy-and-data-security-legislation-update-2011-year-in-review/
(providing a review of privacy-related legislation in 2011); EPIC Bill Track Tracking Privacy,
Speech, and Cyber-Liberties Bills in the 111th Congress, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/bill_track
.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (showing the status of proposed privacy-related legislation).
204
205
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A. Linchpin of U.S. Data Protection Law
In the current U.S. privacy regulatory system, the FTC has grown
into the role of being the leading regulator of privacy, a key linchpin
giving coherence to a partly self-regulatory system that has increasingly become regulated by a jumble of different data protection laws
at the federal and state levels. We contend that this role is critical to
the system’s legitimacy and ability to function.
In contrast to most other countries, the United States regulates
privacy with a sectoral rather than omnibus approach.208 This means
that there are a multitude of different laws regulating different industries rather than just one general statute to regulate all collection and
use of personal data.209 In several instances, particular sectoral laws
leave gaps where entire industries lack privacy regulation.210 These
industries can be regulated in certain dimensions by certain state laws
or common law torts, but a large portion of their activities can remain
unregulated.
As the Internet matured in the 1990s, the gaps in the sectoral
approach were quite significant.211 For example, the healthcare industry and much of the financial services industry lacked federal privacy
regulation.212 These gaps eventually closed, but significant ones still
remain.213 For example, there is no federal law that regulates much of
online commerce.214 Merchants such as Amazon.com lack any federal
sectoral law to regulate the privacy of personal data they collect and
use when selling the majority of their products and services.215 Critics
of the sectoral regime abound.216
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 587.
Id.
210 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 2010, 2011–12 (2013) (“The sectoral U.S. approach, which lacks an effective catch-all
provision, renders American law both reactive and slow to react. As a result, by the time U.S.
regulators seek to challenge an envelope-pushing practice, interest groups supporting the practice have developed, social norms have adjusted to the practice, and a great deal of the sensitive
information at issue has already been disclosed by consumers.”).
211 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 590–91 (discussing failed attempts to apply privacy torts and existing statutory law to Internet privacy issues in mid-to-late 1990s).
212 Id. at 587.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 717, 725 (2001) (“American law is sporadic, confused, and wholly inadequate to protect
citizens in the face of privacy-invasive technical advances and pervasive online commercial surveillance.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 236 (1992) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Privacy in the
208

R

209
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Concerned about consumer confidence, online companies voluntarily made promises about data protection in their privacy policies.217
Originally a feature of websites, privacy policies began to become
common offline too, especially after the GLBA began requiring them
for financial institutions and HIPAA began requiring them for healthcare institutions.218
The making of promises in privacy policies was essentially a selfregulatory system.219 Companies could voluntarily decide whether to
make a promise or not.220 The policies did not specify any sanctions if
the promises were not kept. Moreover, hardly any attempts were
made to enforce the privacy policies under contract law or promissory
estoppel.221 Data protection in many contexts merely amounted to
promises backed up by nothing.
This system was viewed with scorn by many commentators, who
found the privacy policies to be a hollow and toothless means of protecting privacy. Professors Edward Janger and Paul Schwartz noted
the unhappiness felt by both privacy advocates and the financial sector
over the self-regulatory system of privacy policies.222 The Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse stated that, regarding the mandatory privacy
notices under the GLBA, “Industry, government agencies, and consumer education organizations . . . would all do well to view the year
2001 as a costly experiment that resulted in little effective education of
the public about the rights to privacy of personal financial information
under [the GLBA].”223 Janger and Schwartz noted:
Information Economy] (“Since information processing occurs today throughout every industry,
the privacy concerns are not unique to activities in any one context. Because privacy rights in
the United States for commercial information processing depend on legislation targeted at narrow problems and rather limited common law rights, the lack of a coherent and systematic approach to existing privacy concerns presents an undesirable policy void.”); Kamaal Zaidi,
Harmonizing U.S.-EU Online Privacy Laws: Toward a U.S. Comprehensive Regime for the Protection of Personal Data, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2003) (“A drawback to the sectoral
approach is that it is difficult to develop and enforce uniform privacy standards when other
industries not within the purview of government regulation have varying standards.”).
217 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 593–94. Voluntary privacy policies were also
established in an effort to preempt regulation by the federal and state governments. Id. The
idea was that establishing privacy policies, a form of self-regulation, would convince policymakers that additional regulation was unnecessary. Id.
218 Id. at 594.
219 Id. at 593–94.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 595–96.
222 See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2002).
223 Tena Friery & Beth Givens, 2001: The GLB Odyssey—We’re Not There Yet: How Con-
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[The Clearinghouse’s] conclusion has been echoed by Federal Trade Commission Chairman Timothy Muris, who summarized the net result of [GLBA] privacy notices in these
terms: “Acres of trees died to produce a blizzard of barely
comprehensible privacy notices.” It may, in fact, be a rare
legislative feat to have a single statute create so many diverse
critics so quickly.224
It was not clear that this self-regulatory system along with a few
sectoral laws would last. The system was not even held together with
chicken wire, and it was hard to view it as a coherent way to regulate
data protection.
The FTC stepped into this rather rickety patchwork of promises
and narrow laws, and it used its broad Section 5 to fortify this regime.
Initially, the FTC began enforcing promises made in privacy policies,
giving the promises a stronger backbone.225 The FTC’s broad range of
coverage spanned countless industries, thus plastering over the large
gaps and crevices left in between sectoral laws.226 The FTC also
brought a thin layer of coherence to the whole system, and this coherence has gradually thickened over the years.227
The FTC currently remains a key linchpin in the U.S. data protection regulatory regime.228 Its policing of privacy policies has matured
into a more robust set of substantive requirements.229 Norms around
best privacy and data security practices have developed.230 The FTC
has increasingly looked to these norms to add flesh to the very broad
concepts of deception and unfairness.231
In case-by-case fashion, largely by consent decree, the FTC has
developed a data protection jurisprudence that has many attributes of
the common law.232 Self-regulation still plays a big role, with industry
serving as the primary generator of best practice norms.233 Far from
sumers Rial Privacy Notices and Recommendations for Improving Them, PRIVACY RTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 4, 2001), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fp-glb-ftc.htm.
224 Janger & Schwartz, supra note 222, at 1220 (quoting Timothy J. Muris, Remarks at the
Privacy 100 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm).
225 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 585, 599, 667.
226 Id. at 587.
227 Id. at 649.
228 Id. at 600, 604–05.
229 Id. at 648–49.
230 Id. at 662.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 586.
233 See id. at 656 (“[I]t would be quite rare to ‘find an FTC data security case where there
was a serious argument that the security practice met industry norms.’ ”); id. at 661 (explaining
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being externally imposed, the norms the FTC has enforced have been
developed by industry as well as consumer expectations.234 Instead of
imposing top-down rules all at once, the FTC has integrated itself into
a largely self-regulatory approach and gradually developed it into a
more robust regulatory system.
Moreover, the FTC also plays a pivotal role in international confidence regarding privacy in the United States.235 The FTC was an
essential component of the Safe Harbor agreement, which, before its
invalidation by the European Union Court of Justice, allowed personal data to flow between the United States and European Union
(“EU”).236 The EU did not find U.S. data protection law to be adequate in its protection of privacy, and the EU Data Protection Directive directs EU member nations to avoid transferring data to countries
that lack an adequate level of protection.237 The United States hammered out the Safe Harbor arrangement with the EU where data
could be transferred to companies that agreed to follow basic privacy
principles and be subject to FTC enforcement.238 Once again, the
FTC turned promises that would otherwise have been too soft into a
more hardened form of protection.239
Although the Safe Harbor agreement was invalidated by the European Union Court of Justice for failing to provide adequate protection to European citizens, the FTC’s data protection enforcement
authority, remains a key component for the negotiation of agreements
governing the international exchange of personal information. The
FTC is the only governing body in the United States capable of pro-

how industry standards and consumer expectations form the basis for substantive FTC
standards).
234

Id. at 661.

See id. at 603–04. The Safe Harbor agreement was invalidated by the European Union
Court of Justice on grounds that it failed to provide adequate safeguards to European citizens.
See Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Court of Justice Declares That
the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf.
235

236 FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, THE US-EU SAFE HARBOR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FRAMEWORK’S EFFECTIVENESS IN PROTECTING PERSONAL PRIVACY 2 (2013), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF-Safe-Harbor-Report.pdf.
237

See id. at 1.

238

See id. at 2.

See id. (explaining that FTC can bring enforcement actions under Section 5 of the FTC
Act “should the certifying company fail to live up to its Safe Harbor obligations”): id. at 15–21
(discussing FTC enforcement actions under the Safe Harbor agreement).
239
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viding broad data protections to data subjects, a typical requirement
for international data exchange.240
B. Toward a More Expansive FTC Role in Data Protection
The FTC’s role in data protection is not only legally and normatively justified, but it should also be expanded. Because the FTC is
the only agency currently capable of responding to a number of vexing
privacy issues, the agency can and should more aggressively use its
power under Section 5 to develop a coherent U.S. system of data protection law.
1. An Emergent Data Protection Authority
A more centralized and comprehensive approach to data protection is sorely needed in the United States, which is increasingly at
odds with most other countries in the world with its more fragmented
sectoral approach to data protection.241 The chances of Congress
passing a comprehensive federal data protection law are remote. The
most practical way that the U.S. data protection regime will evolve
into something more coherent and comprehensive is through FTC enforcement. Although it is unlikely the United States will ever have a
European-style comprehensive data protection statute, it might be
able to move closer to Europe and much of the rest of the world with
a ground-up approach.
Of course, there will always be industries and contexts where different regulatory standards work better, so totally abandoning any
sectoral differences is not desirable. But establishing some baseline
standards and closing gaps is essential for the U.S. privacy regime to
respond to existing and oncoming problems. More than any other
agency, the FTC has the power and ability to lead the way, but to do
so it must become more aggressive in its activities.
In EU countries and countries modeled after the EU regime,
there is a central data protection authority.242 A data protection authority (“DPA”) is a governmental entity that is focused on regulating
privacy and that does so across most industries.243 In contrast, the
240 See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013).
241 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 587.
242 Zaidi, supra note 216, at 171–72.
243 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN A CONNECTED WORLD: A EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 8–9 (2012) [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0009:
FIN:EN:PDF; Francoise Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New Compliance Requirements
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United States lacks a DPA.244 Instead, various statutes and various
different agencies regulate different industries—the HHS regulates
privacy in healthcare, the Department of Education (“DoE”) regulates privacy in education, the Federal Communications Commission
regulates privacy in telecommunications, and so on.245
In this sectoral approach, with so many different sources of law
and regulation, the FTC can play a harmonizing role. A more aggressive FTC might obviate the need for new laws. The more the FTC
starts acting like a national data protection authority, the fewer the
regulatory gaps and the less need for states to protect their citizens.
There seems to be practically little chance that Congress will pass an
omnibus privacy or data security regulation because of turf wars and
various other infirmities with the current federal legislative process.246
Yet, the sectoral approach is increasingly causing confusion and inefficiency and is at variance with most of the rest of the world.247 The
FTC’s power is broad enough to develop over time a more coherent
and comprehensive body of regulatory activity.
Robert Gellman has argued that the United States needs a federal privacy agency. According to Gellman:
The main objective of a privacy agency would be to promote
the adoption and implementation throughout the United
States of protections for personal privacy and of principles of
Fair Information Practices. Other functions would include
issuing advisory opinions, conducting investigations, proposing rules and legislation, commenting on governmental and
private sector actions affecting privacy, assisting with private
sector self-regulatory efforts, and maintaining international
continuity.248
While Gellman’s proposed privacy agency would not be regulatory, he sees great value in the harmonizing effect such an agency
could have. He observed:
in Sight—What the Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation Means for U.S. Companies, 28
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 817 n.13 (2012).
244

See Zaidi, supra note 216, at 172.

See Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United States:
Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1207 (2003);
Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy, supra note 216, at 201.

R

245

R

Gellman, supra note 245, at 1206–07 (arguing that alternatives to legislation should be
considered because Congress could, at best, agree to “broadly stated general principles”).
246

247

Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 587.

248

Gellman, supra note 245, at 1183.
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For present purposes, it is sufficient to assert that nearly
every institution in the modern world maintains personal
data and that nearly every individual is the subject of data
files maintained by those institutions. Nowhere is this more
true than in the United States, where the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal information is ubiquitous among private and governmental organizations.
. . . Both record keepers and record subjects share risks
and responsibilities regarding the processing of personal
data. A privacy agency would serve the interests of both record keepers and record subjects.249
However, Gellman hesitates to embrace the FTC as a data protection authority, stating:
The FTC’s endorsement of a diluted version of [Fair Information Practices] is one reason that the Commission is
not a good candidate to serve a larger role in privacy policy.
The Commission’s privacy vision is too limited. In addition,
the Commission does not have jurisdiction over many private sector, non-profit, and governmental record keepers.250
We largely agree with Gellman that the FTC could become more
robust in its data protection enforcement. Indeed, the FTC has already been moving in this direction.251 Moreover, specific and feasible
rulemaking authority and increased jurisdiction would be key additional assets for the FTC to perform more effectively the full range of
functions of a DPA.
Currently, U.S. privacy law is a fragmented mess of overlapping
and inconsistent laws that make it nearly impossible for consumers to
figure out how their privacy is protected. Consider how to respond to
the person who asks: “How is my health data protected?” HIPAA
protects “protected health information” which applies to health data
held by covered entities or business associates.252 If the data is held by
a company or person that isn’t a covered entity or a business associate,
it’s not covered by HIPAA. It might be regulated by some state
health privacy laws.253 Or it might not be regulated at all.
Other types of personal data held by other types of companies
could be protected in different ways. If the data were part of an education record at a school, it would be regulated by Family Educational
249
250
251
252
253

Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1205.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 585–86.
42 U.S.C. § 17932(a)–(b) (2012).
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 587.
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Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).254 If it were part of a financial
record held by a financial institution, it would receive a different set of
protections.255 And so on.
Certain uses could trigger common law tort actions, although
with little success.256 There could be contract law claims in connection
with some uses.257 If the data is involved in a data breach, the person
might be entitled to notification by his or her state data breach notification law, but these laws vary considerably from state to state.258 For
many privacy violations, there may be no protection at all. For example, if a company develops an app that uses people’s health data not in
connection with their physicians or hospitals, then the company does
not fall under HIPAA.259 Assuming the company does not have a privacy policy for the app, no protections are even promised. Indeed,
this is a common practice for apps. A 2011 study by the Future of
Privacy Forum found that seventy-five percent of the most
downloaded mobile apps do not have a privacy policy at all.260
254 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); see id.
§ 1232g(a)(4)(A).
255 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012) (describing exceptions for when government authorities may access financial records held by financial institutions)
256 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 590–91.
257 See id. at 595–97.
258 Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 20, at 673–74.
259 See Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal
Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 327, 344 (2002) (describing
HIPAA’s limited coverage).
260 FPF Finds Nearly Three-Quarters of Most Downloaded Mobile Apps Lack a Privacy
Policy, FUTURE PRIVACY F (May 12, 2011), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2011/05/12/fpf-findsnearly-three-quarters-of-most-downloaded-mobile-apps-lack-a-privacy-policy/. Varying conclusions have been reported by other organizations, including the FTC itself. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 23 n.96
(2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf (citing June 2012 study by the Future of Privacy Forum finding “that only 28% of paid
apps and 48% of free apps available in Apple’s iTunes app store included a privacy policy or link
to a privacy policy on the app promotion page”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS:
DISCLOSURES STILL NOT MAKING THE GRADE 7 (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-disclosures-still-not-making-grade/121210mobilekidsappreport.pdf (“Of the 400 [children’s] apps reviewed, only 20% (81) contained any privacy-related
disclosure on the app’s promotion page, on the developer website, or within the app.”); Geoffrey
A. Fowler, Tech Giants Agree to Deal on Privacy Policies for Apps, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, at
B4 (“[California Attorney General Kamala D.] Harris said some 22 of the 30 most-downloaded
mobile apps don’t have privacy policies.”); Jessica Guynn, Facebook to Require Privacy Policies
for All Apps in App Center, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/22/
business/la-fi-facebook-ag-20120622 (stating that, in 2010, 45 “of 101 popular apps for iPhone
and Android phones . . . didn’t provide privacy policies on their websites or inside the apps”);
Cameron Scott, Mobile App Stores to Require, Disclose Privacy Policies, PCWORLD (last visited
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This is why the FTC is needed. Its broad jurisdiction would likely
cover these mobile app companies. The FTC could set a baseline of
protections for consumer health data, or for all companies handling
personal data. Other statutes could provide additional protection and
focus on specific uses, but there would at least be a baseline. Returning to the example of the company with the app collecting health
data that lacks a privacy policy, this company would now run afoul of
the FTC’s new requirement of baseline security practices. The FTC
has asserted that failing to provide adequate data security, even in the
absence of a promise to provide security, is an unfair practice.261
Moreover, the FTC has prohibited certain kinds of data gathering
even when not inconsistent with that specific company’s privacy policy.262 The FTC could take a more aggressive approach here and hold
that failure to have a privacy policy with basic privacy practices is an
unfair or deceptive trade practice.
For example, the FTC has already developed a baseline standard
for specific and explicit notice if certain kinds of sensitive consumer
information are disclosed to third parties, such as geolocation data. In
Goldenshores Technologies,263 the FTC alleged that a mobile flashlight
application “represented, expressly or by implication, that respondents may periodically collect, maintain, process, and use information
from users’ mobile devices to provide software updates, product support, and other services to users related to the Brightest Flashlight
App,” yet the app “failed to disclose or failed to adequately disclose
that, when users run the Brightest Flashlight App, the application
transmits, or allows the transmission of, their devices’ precise geolocation along with persistent device identifiers to various third parties,
including third party advertising networks.”264
According to the FTC, “[t]hese facts would be material to users
in their decision to install the application.”265 Thus, failure to specifiOct. 21, 2015), http://www.pcworld.com/article/250516/mobile_app_stores_to_require_disclose_
privacy_policies.html (“Just 5 percent of all mobile applications offer a privacy policy, according
to a study conducted by TrustE and Harris Interactive. (A developer survey conducted by the
Future of Privacy Foundation found that one-third of apps offer such policies.)”).
261 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 643 (noting that the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence
requires that consumers are provided with notice and choice about what data about them is
collected and used, generally in the form of privacy policies, and that failing to provide adequate
data security, even in the absence of a promise to provide security, is an unfair practice).
262 Id. at 641.
263 Goldenshores Techs., LLC, FTC File No. 132-3087, 2014 WL 1493611 (F.T.C. Mar. 31,
2014).
264 Id. at *3 (complaint).
265 Id.
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cally provide notice of the collection of geolocation data was seen as
deceptive by the FTC.266 Given the high visibility of privacy concerns
and the general trust and expectation of privacy by consumers, might
the FTC also claim that failure to have basic privacy practices is in and
of itself deceptive?
Critics of more expansive FTC enforcement might raise concerns
that increased enforcement would be an impediment to industry and
innovation. Their outcries about lack of notice and unpredictability
might turn into outright shrieks if the FTC started to adopt standards
that were more in the gray zone, where consensus might be less widespread. Companies might find it harder to know what they must do to
be compliant.
The state of data protection today, however, is significantly different than it was a decade ago, let alone two decades ago.267 Industry
standards have evolved and matured, and there is a robust group of
privacy professionals, academics, advocates, and others who can provide feedback.268 Early on, a more restrained approach was compatible with the fact that so much was new and there were not many
people to guide industry. Now, guidance has been established by a
privacy profession and a privacy bar.269 One reason why the FTC can
take a bolder approach is that now companies have access to expertise
and resources to better help them comply.
2. The FTC’s Diverse Toolkit
One of the reasons the FTC is so critical to the modern privacy
regulatory scheme is because it is has a considerably broad and diverse toolkit from which to fashion remedies, allowing the Commission to redress nontraditional forms of harm, balance data protection
against countervailing interests in ways that other areas of law are currently unable to do, and create proactive solutions like those that rely
upon design obligations to decrease risks of privacy and security
harms ex ante.

266

Id. at *3–4.

267

See Gellman, supra note 245, at 1185.

See Andrew Clearwater & J. Trevor Hughes, In the Beginning . . . An Early History of
the Privacy Profession, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 897–98 (2013).
268

269 See id. at 899 n.5 (noting that passage of FCRA created “a bar of folks representing
companies that were the subject of [FCRA privacy] investigations”); infra text accompanying
notes 357, 361.
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a. Redress for Nontraditional Forms of Harm
Contract law and tort law have not often been successfully applied to many of the issues involving the collection, storage, use, and
disclosure of personal data—when courts have applied contract and
tort theories to these issues, they have struggled significantly in the
application.270 More broadly, the law has struggled to recognize privacy violations and data security breaches as harms.271 The Third Circuit observed that:
In this increasingly digitized world, a number of courts
have had occasion to decide whether the “risk of future
harm” posed by data security breaches confers standing on
persons whose information may have been accessed. Most
courts have held that such plaintiffs lack standing because
the harm is too speculative.272
In rejecting the appellant’s contention that an increased risk of
identity theft is itself a harm, the Third Circuit stated that the
“[a]ppellants have alleged no misuse, and therefore, no injury. Indeed, no identifiable taking occurred; all that is known is that a firewall was penetrated. Appellants’ string of hypothetical injuries do not
meet the requirement of an ‘actual or imminent’ injury.”273 Although
some courts have granted standing to plaintiffs merely alleging threat
of future harm,274 plaintiffs are generally unable to succeed in tort and
270 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 590–91, 596–97; see In re iPhone Application Litig.,
844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing constitutional right to privacy, unjust
enrichment, and negligence claims in suit alleging that Apple allowed third-party apps to use
customers’ personal information for commercial purposes); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy
Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing trespass to property, unjust
enrichment, and breach of contract claims against JetBlue when it allegedly transferred passengers’ data to third party); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197, 1200 (D.N.D.
2004) (dismissing breach of contract claim against Northwest Airlines when it allegedly transferred passengers’ data to third party); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1352–53 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (affirming dismissal of cardholders’ invasion of privacy and fraud claims against
American Express when it allegedly rented information on their spending habits to third
parties).
271 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Appellants’ contentions rely
on speculation that the hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood their personal information;
(2) intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use
such information to the detriment of Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in Appellants’ names. Unless and until these conjectures come true, Appellants have not suffered any
injury; there has been no misuse of the information, and thus, no harm.”).
272 Id. at 43.
273 Id. at 44.
274 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v.
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 992 F. Supp.
2d. 1116, 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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contract-based claims for harm resulting from a data breach without
concrete evidence of financial harm like credit card fraud or identity
theft.275
In most other domains of law, harm can be hard to establish because data protection violations often do not lead to immediate physical or financial injury. For example, in the recent opinion dismissing a
claim against Nationwide Mutual Insurance for poor data security
practices, a U.S. district court refused to recognize either an increased
risk of future harm and the cost to mitigate such risk, or loss of privacy
and deprivation of the value of personally identifiable information
(“PII”) as actionable harms that would provide the plaintiffs with
standing to bring negligence, invasion of privacy, and bailment
claims.276 Regarding increased risk of future harm, the court held that
“[i]n this case, an increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud, medical fraud or phishing is not itself an injury-in-fact because Named
Plaintiffs did not allege—or offer facts to make plausible—an allegation that such harm is ‘certainly impending.’ ”277 Regarding the cost to
mitigate the risk of harm, the court held that “[s]uch injury does not
suffice to confer standing because ‘respondents cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears
of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.’ ”278
The court in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.279 similarly rejected plaintiff’s loss of privacy theory of harm, stating “Named
Plaintiffs failed to allege that the loss of privacy has itself resulted in
any adverse consequences apart from the speculative injury of increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud, medical fraud, or phishing.”280 The court was simply unwilling to recognize harm for standing
purposes regardless of whether data “is ever actually misused or the
plaintiff ever suffers adverse consequences from the exposure.”281 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “they suffered an
275 See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 78–80 (1st Cir. 2012); Amburgy v. Express
Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1052–53 (E.D. Mo. 2009); see also LaCourt v. Specific Media,
Inc., No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 WL 1661532, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (finding plaintiffs lacked standing in suit arising from websites’ alleged use of cookies to track users’
Internet usage without their consent).
276

Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651, 654, 657–58 (S.D. Ohio

2014).
277

Id. at 654.

278

Id. at 657 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013)).

279

Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014).

280

Id. at 658.

281

Id.
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injury-in-fact in the form of deprivation of the value of their PII.”282
The court was skeptical of the argument that PII has any inherent
monetary value and stated that “[r]egardless of whether Named Plaintiffs argue the value of their PII has merely diminished or whether
they allege complete deprivation of value, they have failed to allege
any facts explaining how their PII became less valuable to them (or
lost all value) by the data breach.”283 The court appeared to require
evidence of the market’s response to compromised data, noting that
neither Named Plaintiff alleges he tried to sell his PII after
the data breach but was unable to do so because of the
breach or was forced to sell it for less than its full worth. Nor
does either Named Plaintiff allege that any third party sold
his PII and that Named Plaintiff was deprived of his rightful
profit.284
In contrast, the FTC can regulate with a much different and more
flexible understanding of harm. In its statement on unfairness, the
FTC states specifically that “[a]n injury may be sufficiently substantial, however, if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if
it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”285
Harm is a specifically acute problem with respect to data
breaches. What is the harm when data is leaked? This question has
confounded courts, which often don’t recognize a breach as harmful.286 If people’s credit cards are just cancelled and replaced, and
they do not pay anything, are they harmed? If people’s data are
leaked, but they do not suffer from identity theft, are they harmed?
Although courts struggle to recognize harm, there clearly seems to be
a substantial negative impact on people’s lives. The harm of credit
card fraud is that it can take a long time to replace all the credit card
information in various accounts. People have card data on file with
countless businesses and organizations for automatic charges and
other transactions. Replacing all this data can be a major chore. People’s time has a price. That price will vary, but it rarely is zero.
A data breach also causes a harm because people are at greater
risk for fraud and will feel anxiety and concern. People might reasonably spend money and time to protect themselves. One problem is
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
284 Id.
285 UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT, supra note 85, at 1073 n.12; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)
(granting power to declare acts unlawful if the acts cause or are likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers).
286 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
282
283
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that recognizing harm can be a Hobson’s choice for courts. Recognize
harm, even a tiny one, and there’s a floodgate of class action suits and
damage awards that could total billions because of the enormous
numbers of people whose data is affected in a breach. A small harm
multiplied by tens of millions of people can really add up to catastrophic damages for a company. Failing to recognize harm is bad,
too, because there really is harm, and it needs to be appropriately
deterred and redressed.
Harm from a data breach is a central issue in FTC v. Wyndham.
Wyndham claimed in its reply in support of its motion to dismiss that:
Because federal statutes and card-brand rules eliminate the
possibility that consumers can suffer financial injury from the
theft of payment-card data, practices regarding the security
of that data cannot trigger the necessary precondition of
FTC jurisdiction—namely, that there be “substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves.”287
The FTC responded that there need only be a likelihood of injury
through actual financial losses, and that other forms of unavoidable
injury that occurred due to the breach included
unreimbursed fraud charges, the loss of access to funds as a
result of frozen or depleted bank accounts, even if temporary, temporary loss of access to credit, and the cost of reasonable mitigation . . . [including] time, trouble and
aggravation dealing with unwinding this fraud, and with reestablishing recurring payments after the credit cards have to
be changed for hundreds of thousands of consumers.288
In a remarkable footnote in Judge Salas’s district court opinion in
Wyndham recognizing the dispute over whether nonmonetary injuries
are cognizable under Section 5, the court seemed amenable to recog287 Wyndham Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 18, at 7–8 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 45(n)).
288 Transcript of Oral Argument at 126:5–13, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (Civil 13-1887 ES), http://www.pogowasright.org/wp-content/uploads/
FTC_V._WYNDHAM_OralArgument-.pdf. It is important to note that some courts have explicitly rejected similar theories of harm for tort and contract-based claims. See, e.g., Reilly v.
Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Although Appellants have incurred expenses to
monitor their accounts and ‘to protect their personal and financial information from imminent
misuse and/or identity theft,’ they have not done so as a result of any actual injury (e.g. because
their private information was misused or their identities stolen). Rather, they prophylactically
spent money to ease fears of future third-party criminality. Such misuse is only speculative—not
imminent. The claim that they incurred expenses in anticipation of future harm, therefore, is not
sufficient to confer standing.” (citation omitted)); supra text accompanying notes 271–84.
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nizing nonmonetary harm, stating “the Court is not convinced that
non-monetary harm is, as a matter of law, unsustainable under Section
5 of the FTC Act.”289
The other related FTC case adjudicated in federal court relies
upon similar logic. In FTC v. Neovi,290 the Ninth Circuit supported a
lower court’s finding that
[i]t is likely that some consumers never noticed the unauthorized withdrawals. Even if the consumer did notice, obtaining reimbursement required a substantial investment of
time, trouble, aggravation, and money. Further, Defendants’
uncooperativeness only increased this outlay. Neither could
consumers mitigate the period of time during which they lost
access to and use of the funds taken using Defendants’ fraudulent checks. Regardless of whether a bank eventually restored consumers’ money, the consumer suffered
unavoidable injuries that could not be fully mitigated.291
It is a mistake to assume that the only cognizable injuries from
data breaches are financial. One important kind of harm enabled by
data breaches that has been overlooked by many is the use of consumers’ own personal information to trick them. For example, pieces of
information like social security numbers, telephone numbers, and
even credit card numbers are often used to verify an Internet user’s
identity. Malicious actors in possession of such personal information
have a much easier time engaging in “phishing” attacks against the
subject of the data as well as those within the subject’s social network
by spoofing legitimate requests for even more personal and sensitive
information.292 Consumers are less likely to question the authenticity
of a source in possession of such identifying information because it
would appear as though a legitimate source was simply using the information provided by the customer or that the communication was
coming from or endorsed by a friend.293 This practice can be difficult
to discover and track, yet could lead to the mistaken disclosure of personal information due to deception and frustration of consumer
289 Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 623 n.15. The court did not reach the issue, however,
because it concluded the FTC had alleged a substantial injury for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss. Id.
290

FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010).

291

Id. at 1158 (quoting FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 2009 WL 56130, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009).

See Toni Scott Reed, Cybercrime: Losses, Claims, and Potential Insurance Coverage for
the Technology Hazards of the Twenty-First Century, 20 FIDELITY L.J. 55, 58, 60 (2014).
292

293

See id. at 58.
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choice, the tenets of the FTC’s Section 5 prohibitions on deceptive
and unfair trade practices.294
The FTC is also unique in that it has the tools and the motivation
to protect vulnerable populations and has aimed much of its enforcement against those who would seek to unfairly manipulate parties by
exploiting inherent biases and vulnerabilities.295 A considerable portion of the FTC’s enforcement against false advertising is against
those who would exploit the elderly.296 In the realm of privacy,
COPPA was created to protect minors because they are seen as less
capable of making informed decisions regarding disclosing personal
information online.297
This focus on vulnerability places the FTC in a unique position to
respond to those who would exploit the human tendency to make irrational decisions. While such actions might not be recognized as traditional privacy harms, a growing body of research is showing how such
practices, if unregulated, could ultimately harm consumers, perhaps
even in ways they do not even realize.298
Another key benefit is that the FTC need not wait for evidence of
actual harm before it brings a complaint, unlike other regulatory regimes. Recall that the injury required for unfairness may be sufficiently substantial if “raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”299 As
defined by Section 5, “ ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ include[ ]
such acts or practices involving foreign commerce that . . . cause or are
likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United
States.”300 Many privacy and data security harms are not immediately
experienced. When data is leaked or exposed it might be obtained for
fraud a while later. With certain kinds of personal data, there is no
expiration date—the data can be used for fraud now or many years in
the future. Privacy and data security are predominantly about risk.
Risk is a concept that the law often struggles with, because the law is
still shackled with its more primitive foundations where it focused on
294 See supra text accompanying notes 111–12 (identifying exploitation of consumers as
common thread in unfairness and deception actions).
295 See id.
296 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2005).
297 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1034 (2014)
(citing COPPA as an example of a special protection for children, a vulnerable population)
298 See id. at 1024–31 (arguing that “digital market manipulation” can harm consumers);
Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1880, 1891–93 (2013).
299 UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT, supra note 85, at 1073 n.12.
300 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
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more tangible and immediate things. This makes the FTC one of the
few regulatory options for probabilistic theories of privacy harm.
b. Balancing that Accounts for Larger Societal Interests
Another great challenge with privacy and data security cases is
that the harms of violations are often quite dispersed and have a more
of a dispersed societal impact rather than a concentrated impact on
any one individual. The FTC has better tools than those that exist in
many other areas of law to address this kind of impact.
Although an individual can certainly suffer significant harm from
a data protection violation, in many cases, the harm might be small or
difficult to measure. Harm from data protection violations can also
build up from the collective actions of a multitude of actors. In a previous work, one of us likened many data protection violations to a bee
sting: “One bee sting can be shrugged off, but a hundred or a thousand can be lethal.”301 With each sting, the law typically turns its back
and finds the harm not worth addressing. However, if the stings are
not redressed, they collectively can take a greater toll. Many areas of
law are incapable of looking at the larger picture; they myopically focus on the trees and forget that each tree is part of the forest.
In contrast, FTC jurisprudence on injury has a broader focus than
that of many other legal domains. According to the FTC, even incremental harms that affect a large group of consumers can be substantial.302 Indeed, this seems to be one of the contemplated categories of
“substantial injury” from an unfair practice.303 In determining
whether an injury is outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, the FTC considers not only the consumer’s
cost to remedy the alleged injury, but also the cost to society in general.304 According to the FTC, “[t]hese [societal costs] include not
only the costs to the parties directly before the agency, but also the
burdens on society in general in the form of increased paperwork, increased regulatory burdens on the flow of information, reduced incentives to innovation and capital formation, and similar matters.”305
301
302

Solove, supra note 298, at 1891.
See UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT, supra note 85, at 1073 n.12; supra text accompanying note

285.
303 FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An act or practice can cause
‘substantial injury’ by doing a ‘small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant
risk of concrete harm.’ ”) (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
304 UNFAIRNESS STATEMENT, supra note 85, at 1073–74.
305 Id.

R
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The FTC is able to consider a more complete range of concerns
than those addressed by contract and tort law, and is thus able to
achieve a balance that is more subtle and more comprehensive of everything at stake. In evaluating unfairness, the FTC considers whether
a trade practice violates established “public policy as it has been established by statute, common law, industry practice, or otherwise.”306
These two inquiries are not distinct, as the decision on whether a consumer injury is substantial informs the evaluation of unfairness.307
The FTC thus has a broader and more nimble conception of harm
than tort, contract, and many statutes. In many privacy and data security cases, there is a strained discussion of harm that tries to squeeze
data protection harms into legal standards poorly designed to accommodate the nature of these harms.308 The FTC can avoid this morass
because its conception of harm is well suited to data protection cases.
c. Ameliorating Privacy Harms from Institutional Bargaining
The FTC can also mitigate the negative effects that institutional
bargaining has on consumer privacy. Increasingly, consumers’ relationships with companies are negotiated through institutions, and
those consumers are put at the mercy of the organizations negotiating
their fate. For example, when K-12 schools, as well as colleges and
universities, negotiate contracts with cloud-service providers or other
data services, these contracts often fall short of protecting student
privacy.309
A study conducted by Fordham School of Law’s Center on Law
and Information Policy (“CLIP”) revealed that contracts between K12 school districts and cloud service providers often lacked essential
Id. at 1074.
See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 622 (D.N.J. 2014)
(noting that substantial injury is one element of unfairness claim); Neovi, 604 F.3d at 1155
(same).
308 See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14, 19, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2014) (struggling to find causation for standing in data breach
case); In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 980–89 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing class action for privacy violations for failure to state a claim); In re iPhone Application
Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that storage of
privacy-violating geolocation data constituted trespass).
309 See Daniel Solove, Why Schools Are Flunking Privacy and How They Can Improve,
LINKEDIN (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20131217054543-2259773why-schools-are-flunking-privacy-and-how-they-can-improve?trk=mp-reader-card (noting that
school districts often fail to provide adequate notice to parents about use of cloud services and
that none of the agreements with cloud vendors specifically prohibited marketing of students’
information).
306
307
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terms for the protection of student data.310 Many of the analyzed
agreements failed to give the school districts the right to audit and
inspect the vendor’s practices with respect to the transferred data.311
The agreements also failed to prohibit or limit re-disclosure of student
data or other confidential information.312 No agreement “specifically
prohibited the sale and marketing of children’s information.”313
Consumers are caught in the crossfire because their interests are
often ignored in these contracts unless the schools fight for them. In
the context of schools, the DoE under FERPA has very little ability to
do much about this lack of representation, and, unlike HHS, the DoE
has no direct authority to regulate companies receiving education
records.314
Currently, the FTC is likely unable to regulate nonprofit schools
as they are not engaged in commercial activity as long as they refrain
from making a profit or providing other “benefit” to their members.315
However, in similar situations involving for-profit companies, the FTC
has alleged that a company’s failure to adequately choose, contract
JOEL REIDENBERG ET AL., CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, PRIVACY AND CLOUD COMPUBLIC SCHOOLS 18–26 (2013), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/clip/2. For example, the
report notes that 95% of school districts use cloud services. Id. at 19. They are sharing sensitive
student data with these third-party cloud-service providers. Id. at 5. Yet “approximately 20% of
the responding districts had no policies addressing teacher use of information resources.” Id. at
24.
310

PUTING IN

311

See id. at 25.

312

See id. at 29–30.

Id. at 29.
See Benjamin F. Sidbury, Gonzaga University v. Doe and Its Implications: No Right to
Enforce Student Privacy Rights Under FERPA, 29 J.C. & U.L. 655, 657 (2003) (“[T]he language
of the statute suggests that FERPA does not impose a per se prohibition on the disclosure of
educational records to third parties but merely imposes a funding precondition such that an
institution will not receive federal funding if the institution has a ‘policy or practice of permitting
the release of education records.’ An institution, therefore, stands to lose all or a portion of its
federal funding if it has a policy or practice of disclosing its students’ educational records to
unauthorized third parties.” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000))); Bryan Thurmond, Dismantling a Dual-Headed System of Governance: How a Regulatory Overlap Undercuts the Security of Student Health Information in Public Schools, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 701, 707 (2012) (“[A]s
spending clause legislation, [the Department of Education] enforces FERPA’s provisions
through the disbursement or rescission of federal education funds.”).
315 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 766 (1999) (contemplating that “an organization devoted solely to professional education may lie outside the FTC Act’s jurisdictional
reach”); Cmty. Blood Bank of Kan. City Area, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1019–20 (8th Cir.
1969) (finding a corporation does not fall under FTC jurisdiction “so long as its income is devoted exclusively to the purposes of the corporation, and not distributed to members or shareholders,” because “it surely does not cease to be a nonprofit corporation merely because it has
income, or keeps its books and records (as indeed the law might require it to) in much the same
manner as commercial enterprises.”).
313
314

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-6\GWN614.txt

2286

unknown

Seq: 57

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5-JAN-16

12:13

[Vol. 83:2230

with, and oversee a data service provider constituted an unfair and
deceptive trade practice.316 The case, GMR Transcription Services,
Inc.,317 involved the inadvertent exposure of people’s medical data
maintained by GMR, a company that provides medical transcription
services.318 According to the FTC complaint, GMR failed to “adequately verify that their service provider, Fedtrans, implemented reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal
information in audio and transcript files on Fedtrans’ network and
computers used by Fedtrans’ typists.”319 Moreover, the FTC faulted
GMR for failures in properly contracting with its data service provider.320 The FTC complaint alleged that GMR failed to
require Fedtrans by contract to adopt and implement appropriate security measures to protect personal information in
medical audio and transcript files, such as by requiring that
files be securely stored and securely transmitted to typists
(e.g., through encryption) and authenticating typists (e.g.,
through unique user credentials) before granting them access
to such files; and . . . take adequate measures to monitor and
assess whether Fedtrans employed measures to appropriately
protect personal information under the circumstances.321
The FTC additionally found GMR to be deficient in doing due
diligence before hiring its data service provider.322 Looking broadly at
the complaint, there are three key things that the FTC is now requiring companies to do when contracting with data service providers:
(1) exercise due diligence before hiring data service providers;
(2) have appropriate protections of data in their contracts with data
service providers; and (3) take steps to verify that the data service
providers are adequately protecting data.323
Because the FTC’s Section 5 power is generally limited to commercial entities, the FTC lacks the ability to enforce similar responsibilities on school districts. We believe that the FTC should have
authority over noncommercial entities that engage in practices that
result in consumer harm.
316 See GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., FTC File No. 122-3095, 2014 WL 4252393, at *4
(F.T.C. Aug. 14, 2014) (complaint).
317 GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., FTC File No. 122-3095, 2014 WL 4252393 (F.T.C. Aug.
14, 2014).
318 Id. at *2–3 (complaint).
319 Id. at *3.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 See id. at *3–4.
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However, the lack of such authority does not need to preclude
the FTC from becoming involved, as the FTC can bring enforcement
actions against the vendors that enter into such deficient contracts
with schools. In Vision I Properties,324 the FTC brought an action
against a company that provided software to create customized shopping cart pages for other companies.325 Vision I rented people’s personal data, which it collected through its shopping cart software, to
third-party direct marketers.326 This practice was in violation of some
of the privacy policies of the companies using Vision I’s software.327
Even though Vision I was not violating its own privacy policy, the
FTC concluded that it thwarted consumer expectations formed based
upon the privacy policies of the other companies.328 The import of this
case is that the FTC did not see this scenario as involving merely an
arrangement between Vision I and other companies. Consumers were
caught in the middle, and the FTC ensured that their interests would
not be lost in the relationship. Thus, a relationship between a school
district and a company providing data services that harms consumers
might justify FTC enforcement action. Consumers need not have a
direct relationship to companies that cause them harm. Combining
Vision I with GMR suggests that consumers can be harmed when the
appropriate contractual protections are not included in agreements involving the sharing of personal data.
The FTC has taken several steps to develop its theory of data
security that requires companies holding personal information to ensure that third-party recipients will safeguard any data the company
shares.329 Specifically, the FTC has filed complaints of unfairness
324

Vision I Properties, LLC, FTC File No. 042-3068, 2005 WL 1274741 (F.T.C. Apr. 19,

2005).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2.
327 Id. at *2.
328 See id. at *1–2.
329 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and Privacy and Security Duties for
the Cloud, 13 BNA PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 577, 580 (2014). For examples of FTC critiques of inadequate third-party access control, see, e.g., Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 12;
Complaint at 7, United States v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., No. 09-cv-524 PJS/JJK (D. Minn.
Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/FTC%20v_%20RRS%20
Complaint.pdf; Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, & Other Equitable Relief
at 5, United States v. ValueClick, Inc., No. CV08-01711 MMM (RZx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080317complaint.pdf; Upromise,
Inc., FTC File No. 102-3116, 2012 WL 1225058, at *3–4 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) (complaint); ACRAnet, Inc., 152 F.T.C. 367, 368–69 (2011) (complaint); Premier Capital Lending Complaint,
supra note 144, at 3–4; Nations Title Agency Complaint, supra note 144, at 2. This includes
failure to verify and authenticate the identities of third-party recipients as well as failure to
325
326
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against companies it alleged failed to verify and authenticate identity
of third-party recipients,330 failed to monitor data recipients’ activity,331 and failed to require by contract third-party protection of information.332 Elsewhere, we have noted that there are two emerging
strands of FTC jurisprudence that can address the consumer vulnerabilities inherent in institutional bargaining.333 We noted, “[t]he first
[strand] pertains to data stewardship for the organizations that share
personal data with cloud service providers. And the second pertains
to third-party beneficiaries, where the FTC has recognized that consumers need not be a primary party to a contract in order to receive
protection under the FTC Act.”334 We argued that these “two strands
are essentially flip sides of the same coin. Under this approach, data
collectors must act as data stewards and protect consumers when the
organization shares information with [third-party data handlers, like]
cloud provider[s].”335 “Likewise,” we argued that the third-party data
recipient and processor “also owes a duty to consumers, who are essentially third-party beneficiaries of the data collector’s efforts to ensure privacy and data security in their institutional bargaining.”336
The FTC should apply this theory to other privacy-based requirements, “such as requirements for confidentiality and data minimization and prohibitions on re-identification, data mining, and certain
kinds of advertising and marketing to those identified” in the data.337

monitor or otherwise identify unauthorized recipient activity. See Complaint for Civil Penalties,
Permanent Injunction, & Other Equitable Relief at 4–6, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1
06-CV-0198 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter ChoicePoint Complaint], http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf (discussing defective verification policies). It also
includes general charges of failing to protect information in the hands of third-party recipients as
well as very specific charges by the FTC such as “[f]ailing to oversee service providers and to
require them by contract to implement safeguards to protect respondent’s customer information.” Nations Title Agency Complaint, supra note 144, at 4.
See, e.g., ChoicePoint Complaint, supra note 329, at 5 (admonishing company for accepting contradictory verification documentation).
330

331

See ChoicePoint Complaint, supra note 329, at 9.

See Nations Title Agency Complaint, supra note 144, at 4. This is also a violation of the
GLBA Safeguards Rule. See, e.g., Sunbelt Lending Servs., Inc., 139 F.T.C. 1, 2–3 (2005) (complaint) (setting out violations of Safeguards Rule); Nations Title Agency Complaint, supra note
144, at 3–4 (same).
332

333

Solove & Hartzog, supra note 329, at 578.

334

Id.

335

Id.

336

Id.

337

Id. at 580.
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ESSENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS

What are the limits of FTC power? What limits should there be
on FTC power? Thus far, we have argued that the FTC enjoys very
broad powers for data protection enforcement and that the FTC
should use these powers more robustly. But, of course, there are legal
limits to how far the FTC can go. And there are certainly reasons for
some degree of caution. In this Part, we discuss what the FTC is unable to do and what the FTC should avoid doing.
We argue that, although the FTC should certainly hit the accelerator and move beyond being very conservative in its enforcement, the
FTC should be careful not to become too much of what Cass Sunstein
and others have referred to as a “norm entrepreneur.”338 We also discuss certain shortcomings in existing FTC enforcement practices that
should be improved. We argue that, if the FTC is to embrace a
greater role in data protection, it must be more transparent in defining
the contours of Section 5. The FTC must also be more proportionate
in its enforcement of Section 5 to reflect the full range of actions that
constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices. Such changes are necessary to better encourage companies to act fairly and honestly. They
are also necessary to better enable all companies, even those with limited resources, to proactively protect consumer data.
A. The Limits of Section 5 Authority
The FTC’s Section 5 authority is not boundless. As previously
indicated, the FTC lacks jurisdiction over banks, savings and loan institutions, federal credit unions, common carriers, air carriers, meat
packers, and non-profit entities.339 Additionally, the previously mentioned requirements of materiality,340 balancing,341 and harm342 facially
limit the scope of valid complaints alleging unfair and deceptive trade
practices.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),343 the FTC is
also prohibited from acting arbitrarily or capriciously, or abusing its
discretion.344 Although actions must be extreme to be labeled arbi338 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996);
see infra text accompanying note 364.
339 See supra note 16.
340 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 304–06.
342 See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
343 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
344 5 U.S.C. § 706.

R
R
R
R
R
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trary, capricious, or an abuse of authority,345 this limit prohibits a blind
disregard the FTC’s delegated power.346 Professor Jeff Sovern has
noted that:
[T]he FTC Act itself limits the FTC to some degree by providing that the FTC may bring only proceedings which
“would be to the interest of the public. . . .” While courts
usually defer to the FTC on which actions are in the public
interest, and thus the public interest requirement is not a terribly stringent limitation, courts claim they will overturn an
FTC action if they find an abuse of discretion.347
The First Circuit recently stated that:
The APA requires a reviewing court to set aside an agency
decision when the administrative record shows that the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” An agency decision fails to
pass this test if the administrative record reveals that “the
agency relied on improper factors, failed to consider pertinent aspects of the problem, offered a rationale contradicting
the evidence before it, or reached a conclusion so implausible that it cannot be attributed to a difference of opinion or
the application of agency expertise.”348
345 See Comment, Abuse of Discretion: Administrative Expertise vs. Judicial Surveillance,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 41–42 (1966) (noting that courts avoid striking down agency decisions
unless the agency “has clearly acted unreasonably”).
346 See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Review under the
‘arbitrary and capricious’ tag line . . . encompasses a range of levels of deference to the agency,
and . . . an agency’s refusal to institute rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the range. . . .
Such a refusal is to be overturned ‘only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances,’
which have primarily involved ‘plain errors of law, suggesting that the agency has been blind to
the source of its delegated power.’ ”) (citations omitted) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 29
(1983))).
347 Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the
FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 442 (1991) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988)).
348 Atieh v. Riordan, 727 F.3d 73, 75–76 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (first quoting 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); then quoting Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109
(1st Cir. 1997)); see also Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the APA’s review standard “is met only where the party challenging the agency’s
decision meets a heavy burden of showing that ‘the agency has relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.’ ” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)); Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“An abuse
of discretion [under the APA] occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation
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As previously noted, the FTC must also provide fair notice to
those it regulates.349 Gerard M. Stegmaier and Wendell Bartnick note
that “[t]he fair notice doctrine requires that entities be able to reasonably understand whether their behavior complies with the law. If an
entity acting in good faith cannot identify with ‘ascertainable certainty’ the standards to which an agency expects it to conform, the
agency has not provided fair notice.”350
While a reasonableness requirement tethered to industry standards is a common and acceptable practice, presumably the FTC
would run afoul of fair notice problems if it disassociated its reasonableness mandate from standards that are commonly understood by
those in the context in which they are regulated. If the FTC were to
reject industry standards and obligate companies to act in a way that
significantly deviated from reasonable, responsible companies, it
would presumably be required to provide more specific guidance—
perhaps even to the point of being obligated to create specific rules.
Critics allege that they are wholly without guidance for what constitutes fair data security practices.351 But the FTC’s requirements
have not been forged arbitrarily or out of whole cloth. Because the
FTC, like numerous other federal and state statutes, has tethered its
data security obligations to industry standards,352 guidance is plentiful.
B. The Appropriate Level of Restraint
As we have argued earlier, the FTC has been rather conservative
in its enforcement, eschewing the role of being a norm entrepreneur.353 There are likely many reasons for this restraint, including a
deference to some self-regulatory efforts, limited resources, and political considerations. Thus, the FTC’s conservative approach has
brought considerable benefits, and has been quite wise. But the fact
of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, or represents an
unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.”); Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996)
(“We have pointed out that courts can abuse discretion in any of three aspects, namely, by
neglecting to consider a significant factor that appropriately bears on the discretionary decision,
by attaching weight to a factor that does not appropriately bear on the decision, or by assaying
all the proper factors and no improper ones, but nonetheless making a clear judgmental error in
weighing them.”); Diaz-Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that an
agency’s “decision may be reversed as an abuse of discretion when it is made without rational
explanation, or inexplicably departs from established policies”).
349 See supra Part I.B.3.
350 Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 155, at 19.
351 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 6, at 170.
352 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
353 See supra Part I.B.3.
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that this approach has worked in the past does not mean that it is best
suited for the future.
We contend that the FTC should not continue on with the same
level of restraint that it has exhibited thus far. In the early days of
FTC data protection enforcement, so many privacy norms had yet to
develop. Most companies lacked privacy officers.354 There was barely
a privacy bar.355 In contrast, today there is an established support system of privacy professionals dedicated to helping companies understand their obligations under certain privacy regimes like the FTC.356
Andrew Clearwater and Trevor Hughes wrote:
From essentially no active professionals in the 1970s and
1980s, the privacy profession has grown to at least 13,000
people working on managing information privacy within
their organizations. As the information economy continues
to grow—pushed by the breath-taking speed of technological
development, cloud computing, big data, and emerging uses
for exponentially increasing stores of data—it is reasonable
to expect that the privacy profession will grow.357
These counselors have a nuanced understanding of the significance of the FTC complaints and are able to rely on the FTC’s guidance as well as industry standards to competently advise their
clients.358 In short, the system is primed and ready for the FTC to take
on a bigger role.
The threats to privacy posed by the digital age are no longer
novel, but privacy law has yet to adequately respond to many of them.
With an established regulatory compliance support system in place
and a grant of power well suited to tackle the slipperiest aspects of
privacy law, the time has come for the FTC to fulfill its potential.
The viability of the FTC’s role depends partially on the extent of
its influence on privacy professionals. The FTC has limited resources359 and can only pursue a few privacy and data cases each
354 See Clearwater & Hughes, supra note 268, at 904 (estimating that first chief privacy
officer in the United States was hired in mid-1990s).
355

See id. at 899 n.5.

356

Id. at 897–98.

R

Id. The International Association of Privacy Professionals, one of the largest associations of its kind, recently enrolled its 15,000th member. See Sam Pelfie, IAPP Hits 15k Members,
INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS: PRIVACY ADVISOR (Feb. 13, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/iapphits-15k-members/.
357

358

See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 585.

R

359

Sovern, supra note 347, at 442.
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year.360 One reason it is able to achieve broad enforcement without
having to bring thousands of cases each year is that privacy professionals review the FTC’s activities and take steps to comply. In-house
privacy counsel have an incentive to stay ahead of the FTC and avoid
regulatory trouble for their organizations. They help bring the FTC’s
activities to the attention of the C-Suite, who otherwise might not be
aware of what the FTC is doing, or why it matters. Outside counsel
also advise on the FTC’s activities. Whenever the FTC resolves a new
case, the privacy bar goes aflutter, and blog posts are written on blogs
of large law firms, as are updates in various other media forums.361 In
other words, whenever the FTC speaks, the privacy bar amplifies it
and spreads the word. This helps to encourage companies to comply.
Once the FTC has brought an enforcement action based on a particular standard, that standard achieves a new level of legitimacy and
formality. For all intents and purposes, the standard becomes law.362
Because the law of privacy and data security is so fragmented, so
magma-like in its nature, the FTC has had an unusually influential
role in shaping the law of privacy and data security by embracing certain standards and norms that have achieved a decent level of consensus.363 The FTC should certainly push toward the logical implications
of certain norms, but it must be careful not to be too radical. There
must be a foundation.
Given the amplifying and legitimizing role of FTC actions, the
agency should be careful to avoid embracing norms that lack a fair
degree of consensus. Sunstein has written that
[e]xisting social conditions are often more fragile than might
be supposed, because they depend on social norms to
which—and this is the key point—people may not have
much allegiance. What I will call norm entrepreneurs—people interested in changing social norms—can exploit this
fact.364
So far, the FTC has served as “more of a standard codifier than a
standard maker. Instead of blazing a trail by creating new norms and
360 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 600 (noting that the FTC brings roughly ten privacyrelated cases per year).
361 See, e.g., HUNTON & WILLIAMS: PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG, https://www
.huntonprivacyblog.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
362 See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7 (arguing that FTC rulings constitute a de
facto common law of privacy).
363 See id.
364 Sunstein, supra note 338, at 909.
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standards, the FTC has waited until norms and standards have developed and then begun enforcement.”365
Though the FTC’s direct and indirect powers are great, the FTC
is still subject to political pressure. In describing some practical restraints on the FTC, Sovern has noted that Congress has the power to
limit FTC power if the FTC oversteps, and that the FTC has budget
and staff limitations and thus is “unlikely to expend its scarce resources on trivial deceptions.”366
Moreover, there are certain types of harm that the FTC is not as
well poised to redress. For example, compensatory remedies are better handled by tort law or other statutes because the FTC’s role is
largely to discourage bad behavior, not to compensate affected parties.367 The FTC also operates under significant resource constraints,
and has generally brought only about ten to twenty-five privacy and
data security cases per year.368 So there is good reason not to completely abandon the panoply of other remedies for privacy harms. Although the FTC can certainly play a larger role in the privacy
regulatory ecosystem, it is not capable of shouldering the entire burden of protecting personal information.
C. Areas for Improvement
If the FTC is going to develop its jurisprudence in an incremental
and bottom-up way similar to the common law, it must do a better job
articulating the metes and bounds of Section 5. While the FTC provides a fair amount of information in many of its complaints, it could
do more. Often, discussions of harm and balancing are either
marginalized or completely absent from complaints alleging unfairness.369 If the FTC’s incremental approach is to be fully embraced, it
should better recognize the fact that many companies and counselors
rely on its complaints to shape guidance and behavior.
To properly proceed in an incremental and bottom-up fashion,
the FTC should be more transparent about the investigations that result in a finding of fair and truthful trade practices. While companies
receive notice of complaints actually filed by the FTC, they usually do
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 329, at 578.
Sovern, supra note 347, at 441–42.
367 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (empowering FTC to “prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition” (emphasis added)).
368 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 600.
369 See, e.g., GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., FTC File No. 122-3095, 2014 WL 4252393, at
*1–4 (F.T.C. Aug. 14, 2014) (complaint) (alleging only that consumers were unaware of respondent’s practices, but not explicitly identifying resulting harm).
365
366
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not get the benefit of knowing when an FTC investigation did not
result in the filing of a complaint.370 The FTC does occasionally send
closing letters to companies when they have investigated an alleged
unfair or deceptive practice but have decided not to pursue an enforcement action.371 However, the FTC should issue more of these
letters, particularly with respect to privacy-related allegations of unfair practices, and the agency should provide more detail regarding its
interpretation of Section 5 to the facts at issue. This information can
be quite helpful to all companies in the industry, providing some indication as to which practices the FTC considered fair and truthful.
One good example of a closing letter regarding data security is
the FTC’s letter to Monster Worldwide, Inc. regarding a data security
breach that resulted in the use of data of over a million customers who
sought jobs using Monster’s services in a targeted phishing campaign.372 The FTC did not file a complaint against Monster.373 According to the FTC:
Our investigation of Monster sought to determine
whether Monster engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices by failing to provide reasonable security for its customer contact information. The investigation focused on the
risks raised by Monster’s storage of this information and
whether Monster acted reasonably in anticipating and addressing those risks.374
In listing the reasons why the agency decided to close the investigation, it considered many factors including:
the extent to which the risk at issue was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the compromise; the nature and magnitude of the risk relative to the other risks; the benefits
relative to the costs of protecting against the risk; Monster’s
overall data security practices; the duration and scope of the
compromise; the level of consumer injury; the type of infor370 See Allison Grande, FTC Bureau Head Wants More Privacy Closing Letters Issued,
LAW360 (Dec. 3, 2014, 9:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/601348/ftc-bureau-head-wantsmore-privacy-closing-letters-issued.
371 See, e.g., Letter from Joel Winston, Assoc. Dir., FTC Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., to
Timothy C. Blank, Dechert, LLP (Mar. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Winston Closing Letter], http://www
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/monster-worldwide-inc./monsterworldwide
.pdf; see also Staff Closing Letters, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/closing-letters-and-other-public-statements/staff-closing-letters (last visited Oct. 21,
2015).
372 Winston Closing Letter, supra note 371, at 1.
373 See id. at 1–2.
374 Id. at 1.
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mation disclosed without authorization; and Monster’s overall response to the incident.375
The FTC stated that “[a]pplying these factors, the circumstances
in this matter contrast with those in recent enforcement actions
brought by the Commission, many of which involved significant failures to address well-known vulnerabilities affecting inherently sensitive personal information such as Social Security numbers and credit
card numbers.”376
The FTC then offered more guidance for Monster and other companies dealing with personal information stating:
We continue to emphasize that data security is an ongoing process, and that as risks, technologies, and circumstances change over time, companies must adjust their
information security programs accordingly. As noted above,
the staff is concerned with the growing prevalence of personalized or targeting phishing attacks—attacks that may be facilitated by the failure to provide reasonable security for
storehouses of customer contact information accessible for
viewing and downloading online. Thus, we expect companies that house such data to take appropriate steps to protect
it.377
The FTC then went a step further to provide specific notice of
what constitutes good security practices, stating:
Depending on the circumstances, such steps may include:
avoiding the use of simple, easily guessed passwords or other
credentials used by customers to access company data; implementing measures to ensure that those who access the
company’s online services using legitimate customer credentials are in fact authorized users of the system; and training
customer service representatives to detect and defeat attempts to obtain customer credentials though social engineering or pretexting. . . . Further, we expect such
companies to remain vigilant in identifying new methods of
attack by fraudsters and identity thieves and taking reasonable precautions to defend against such attacks.378
Thus, in this one letter in 2008, the FTC identified a threat to
consumers and a corresponding obligation of companies, explained
why the FTC did not pursue an enforcement action against the com375
376
377
378

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pany under investigation, and provided explicit steps for fair data security practices to be followed by all parties handling consumer data.
In short, the FTC must become more transparent. Closing letters
like the one issued to Monster are a great start. As we have argued in
an earlier article, the FTC is developing the functional equivalent of a
common law of data protection.379 In order to do so effectively, it
must provide information not just about why companies are in violation of Section 5 but also about why companies might not be. Having
information about cases that are dropped is key to understanding the
whole picture. In the common law, courts cannot make public only
opinions granting summary judgment and not disclose opinions denying summary judgment.
Moreover, more flexibility should be exercised by the FTC in rewarding companies for the good things that they are doing. There are
many dimensions to how companies engage in data protection, and
the FTC often focuses only on the shortcomings. But in many cases,
the situation is not as binary as good or bad. Instead, there is often a
mix of good and bad practices. Companies may do 99 out of 100
things right, make only one mistake, and be in violation of Section 5.
These mistakes should be penalized, but companies that do 0 out of
100 things right should be treated differently than those that do 99 out
of 100 right. In its consent decrees, the FTC has not done enough to
adjust the audit period or other measures to reward good practices
when there is good mixed with bad.
One thing the FTC could do is to seek milder punishments and
shorter auditing periods for companies that have done most things
right and have made a good faith attempt at compliance. While the
FTC does not enter into a twenty-year consent order with every company it files a privacy-related complaint against, this burdensome
timescale is the most common duration for such agreements.380 For
some truly reckless organizations, this duration is likely justified. Yet
for those companies that did many things right and other things
wrong, a twenty-year consent order is overkill. The FTC should consider consent orders that last only a few years for companies that took
significant steps to protect user data yet still ran afoul of Section 5.
Moreover, shorter periods would free up FTC resources, hopefully enabling the Commission to increase the number of enforcement actions
it brings.
379
380

Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 606–25.
Id. at 606.
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More proportionate and milder penalties could have a number of
positive effects. It would encourage risk-averse companies to engage
in as many mitigating practices as possible to ensure that in the event
a company is the subject of an FTC complaint the sting will be minimized. Yet the new policy would still allow the FTC a great deal of
flexibility in defining what practices are deceptive or unfair under Section 5 because merely engaging in some good data protection practices would not guarantee immunity from prosecution. Furthermore,
the new policy may incentivize the FTC to pursue a few more complaints in acknowledged industry gray areas rather than just “slam
dunk” cases. This would provide more guidance for companies at the
margins and better reflect a true common law-like approach to data
protection.
If the FTC chooses to operate more in a gray zone, a proportionate punishment approach would allow the penalties to be lower than
in those cases where there is already precedent addressing the particular issue. Companies should be expected to follow the FTC’s jurisprudence in these gray areas much like they would follow any other
common law standards in areas relevant to their business. When standards are clearly established, violations should be treated more
harshly than when new standards are being recognized or developed.
If the FTC plans to take a bolder role on a new issue, recognizing
a new standard or pushing the law forward in a more aggressive way,
it should at first provide a little leeway to companies, taking a training
wheels-style approach, with reduced punishment. After a reasonable
time period, the training wheels should come off, and no leniency
should be granted. If the FTC wants to develop the law at a greater
pace, the process will likely go more smoothly under such a flexible,
graduated penalty approach. This approach will also address concerns
about fair notice raised by critics, which are likely to intensify if the
FTC exercises its power more robustly.
There are other potential areas of improvement for the FTC. The
FTC should make sure that its enforcement through consent orders
that require compliance and ongoing assessment is effective.381 As we
noted earlier, the FTC would require assistance from Congress to ex381 See Chris Hoofnagle, Assessing the Assessments, FED. TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY
LAW & POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2015), https://hoofnagle.berkeley.edu/ftcprivacy/assessing-the-assessments/ (arguing “[t]he FTC is aware that it cannot effectively supervise all the companies under
consent decree. Thus, in many cases, companies are required to perform an assessment but not
required to submit it to the Agency. Doing so allows the FTC to avoid having knowledge of a
problematic practice that is disclosed in an assessment, but not fully understood by the staff who
review assessments.”).
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pand its jurisdiction to include noncommercial entities that are engaging in commercial practices.382 Moreover, explicit rulemaking
authority would be an essential tool for the FTC to develop more systematic rules where they are needed, to increase the clarity of its guidance, and to more nimbly integrate mitigating factors into its analysis
of how companies violating Section 5 should be treated.
Ultimately, however, privacy and data security are complex issues
that depend heavily on context. They cannot be readily reduced to a
punch list, but instead involve a considerable amount of balancing of
different values. Guidance and rules are good, but there are limits to
how complete and specific they can be for issues that are highly complex, dynamic, and contextual. This is why the case-by-case approach
should remain a key feature of the system.
CONCLUSION
Despite a wave of criticism claiming that the FTC’s data protection enforcement is exceeding its delegated powers, the FTC has, in
fact, been well within the scope of its authority. There is significant
room in the broad domain marked out by Section 5 of the FTC Act
for the FTC to expand its enforcement and develop more progressive
data protection standards. And the FTC should do so. Not only
would expanded FTC involvement in this domain help protect consumers, but it will also help harmonize a fragmented and discordant
data protection regulatory regime and make the U.S. approach more
consistent with that of other countries, facilitating the secure exchange
of data across borders. The FTC has great potential to regulate data
protection with the appropriate nuance and focus.
The FTC was right to be initially conservative as it slowly began
to regulate unfair and deceptive privacy-related practices. In the late
1990s, when the FTC first started bringing privacy-related complaints,
it was unclear how privacy-related activities should be regulated and
who should take the lead in doing so. However, much has changed
over the past two decades. An entire body of complaints has given
shape to the FTC’s broad mandate. A robust community of privacy
professionals now exists to counsel companies of all sizes on their data
protection obligations. New technologies like facial recognition and
biometrics, as well as new concepts like big data and digital marketing
manipulation, will continue to challenge policymakers.
382

See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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Now is the right time for the FTC to move boldly forward. The
FTC has robust powers, and it should be make use of them to a much
greater degree, provided that the agency also becomes more transparent in its enforcement and more willing to use a mixture of carrots and
sticks. It has the ability to develop the law of data protection in effective new ways. Over the past two decades, the FTC has slowly inched
its way into a more central role in regulating data protection. Now, it
is in the ideal position to take center stage and take U.S. data protection law to a new level.

